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ABSTRACT 
 
The Misplaced Role of “Utilitarianism” in John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism.  
(August 2012) 
David Eugene Wright, B.A, Bethel College; 
M.A., Ohio University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. R.J.Q. Adams 
 
 This thesis aims to provide the appropriate historical context for interpreting John 
Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism. The central question considered here concerns two views of 
Mill’s intentions for Utilitarianism, and whether the work should be read as Mill arguing 
for his own version of utilitarianism, or as an ecumenical document expressing and 
defending the views of many utilitarians. The first view, labeled the orthodox view, as 
defended by Roger Crisp, is probably the most commonly held view as to how to 
interpret the document. The second view, labeled the revisionist view, is defended by 
Daniel Jacobson in a recent article. By examining Mill’s place in the history of 
utilitarianism, his journals, correspondence, and other writings leading up to and after 
the publication of Utilitarianism, this thesis argues in support of the revisionist position. 
Furthermore, it is argued that certain portions of the book deserve special consideration 
apart from other chapters, and this is taken to have implications for the future of research 
in Mill’s thought.   
 iv 
 This thesis has four chapters including the first introductory chapter, which 
outlines the motivations guiding the orthodox and revisionist views. The second chapter 
provides a general exposition of Utilitarianism, as well as an outline of the primary 
evidence supporting the orthodox and revisionist positions. The third chapter is a defense 
of the revisionist position, and it highlights the specific biographical context in which 
Utilitarianism was composed, as well as evidence from Mill’s writings, correspondence, 
and journals suggesting that he saw the need to write a general defense of the principle 
of utility and elaborate his theory of justice. This chapter also includes a 
historiographical analysis of Mill’s biographers, which suggests that Utilitarianism is not 
viewed by Mill’s biographers as being especially central to his considered views on 
utilitarianism. Finally, the chapter includes a section on the early reception and 
criticisms offered against Utilitarianism, which partly explains why the book has come 
to be interpreted as it has. The final chapter reviews the evidence for the revisionist 
position and explains the implications for Mill scholarship in light of the findings of this 
study.     
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
  
Contemporary scholars of moral philosophy often identify John Stuart Mill’s 
Utilitarianism as one of the more important works in moral theory in the last two 
hundred years.1 Since its 1861 publication in three installments in Fraser’s Magazine for 
Town and Country (hereafter Fraser’s), it has become a sourcebook both for those 
wishing to criticize and those who hope to defend various tenets of utilitarian morality. 
Of course, clarifying precisely what kind of moral theory Mill is discussing in that work 
has been a matter of great contention for some time among Mill scholars. While many 
scholars attempt to deduce Mill’s final judgments about moral theory by giving special 
prominence to the arguments contained within the pages of Utilitarianism, some 
scholars have raised difficulties with such an approach. One scholar in particular, Daniel 
Jacobson, has questioned the importance typically ascribed Utilitarianism within Mill’s 
corpus of writings.2 Jacobson argues that by looking at Mill’s comments about the 
document in his correspondence, Mill’s arguments within the document, and Mill’s 
actions concerning the document’s publication and subsequent revisions, one finds good 
reason to re-evaluate the work’s prominence in Mill’s oeuvre. Ultimately, Jacobson 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of The Chicago Manual of Style.  
1 In the course of his three-volume history of moral philosophy Terence Irwin writes that “The 
most influential and most widely read defense of utilitarianism is Mill’s short book Utilitarianism, 
published in 1861.” Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, vol. III, 
From Kant to Rawls (New York: Oxford, 2009), 365.  
2 Daniel Jacobson, “J.S. Mill and the Diversity of Utilitarianism,” Philosophers Imprint 3 (2003): 
1-18.  
 2 
argues that the kind of utilitarianism discussed within Utilitarianism is an ecumenical 
doctrine: a doctrine that is specifically designed to have wide appeal among those who 
accept this philosophical label, but one that should not necessarily be ascribed to Mill. 
This thesis will demonstrate that though this view represents a sharp break with much of 
Mill scholarship and is still in need of further argumentation, there are strong reasons to 
support Jacobson’s general position.  
At stake in the dispute over the importance of Utilitarianism are the means to 
settle the debate over what kind of utilitarianism Mill ultimately defended. Stated 
generally, utilitarianism is the view that the morally correct action is whatever action 
promotes the most good.3 Utilitarians differ, of course, as soon as one begins to specify 
what actions are moral actions, what the good amounts to, how one promotes it, as well 
as other questions. Insofar as intellectual historians and philosophers are interested in 
clarifying the origins and morphology of ideas, it is surely a matter of interest to answer 
the question of what kind of utilitarianism Mill ascribed to. This seems especially 
relevant since he stands as one of the most famous of all utilitarian theorists. Of course, 
untangling Mill’s general view on the matter from what he wrote in Utilitarianism is not 
so simple. As Quentin Skinner has written in his influential article on the proper practice 
of intellectual history, this involves several distinct components:  
The essential question which we therefore confront, in studying any given text, is 
what its author, in writing at the time he did write for the audience he intended to  
                                                 
3 For some perspective on how this definition fits with figures in the history of the view consult  
Julia Driver, "The History of Utilitarianism", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford 
University, 1997-, article published Summer 2009, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/utilitarianism-history 
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address, could in practice have been intending to communicate by the utterance 
of this given utterance. It follows that the essential aim, in any attempt to 
understand the utterances themselves, must be to recover this complex intention 
on the part of the author.4 
 
One of the objectives here is to illuminate Mill’s “complex intention” in 
composing Utilitarianism using the methods of intellectual history. This will involve 
explaining some points in the history of utilitarianism, periods of Mill’s biography 
relevant to his moral philosophy, Mill’s place in the intellectual milieu of England in the 
mid-nineteenth century, prominent reactions to Utilitarianism in the years immediately 
following the work’s publication, and the importance of contemporary debates in moral 
theory and how these debates have altered philosophers’ views of Mill’s work.  
When it comes to interpreting the appropriate historical understanding of 
Utilitarianism, this study will regularly contrast the views of Roger Crisp and Daniel 
Jacobson. Crisp served as the editor of and commentator on a scholarly edition of Mill’s 
Utilitarianism and authored a guidebook and several articles on Mill.5 Crisp sums up his 
general attitude toward the question of how to interpret Utilitarianism when he writes  
                                                 
4 Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8 
(1969), 48-49. 
5 Roger Crisp, ed. Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Guidebook to Mill on 
Utilitarianism (London: Routledge, 1997); Roger Crisp, “Mill on virtue as a part of happiness,” British 
Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (1996): 367-380; “Sanctions in Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick” in 
Henry Sidgwick R. Harrison, ed. (Oxford: Published for The British Academy by Oxford University Press, 
2001), 93-116. Crisp is treated in this study as the representative for the orthodox position, but the view is 
very widely held in Mill scholarship. One prominent scholar writes that the book “is a kind of extended 
memo to his contemporaries, setting out for them Mill’s personal understanding of utilitarianism.” John 
Skorupski, “Utilitarianism in Mill’s Philosophy,” in The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism, ed., 
Henry West., (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 46. Though she does not agree with Crisp as to how to interpret 
Mill’s moral philosophy or the intended audience of Utilitarianism another prominent Mill scholar, also 
treats the book as Mill’s definitive work in moral philosophy in her essay Wendy Donner, “Mill’s 
Utilitarianism” in The Cambridge Companion to Mill, ed., John Skorupski, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 255-292.  
. 
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that, “in so far as Mill was an evangelist, Utilitarianism . . . can be seen as his Bible . . . 
it was clearly intended to be the summation, and defense, of his thoughts on the doctrine 
which provided the foundation for his views.”6 Thus, if one is trying to discern Mill’s 
considered judgment on utilitarianism, then any of Mill’s other claims about moral 
philosophy that are in tension with Utilitarianism have a pro tanto reason against 
consideration as representative of Mill’s considered view. If Jacobson is correct, 
however, there is good reason to think that, far from being his Bible, Utilitarianism is a 
work aimed at a popular audience of those who might be confused about certain 
elements of the doctrine. On Jacobson’s view, Mill is primarily trying to dispel certain 
misconceptions and debunk fallacious arguments commonly presented against 
utilitarianism. To discern Mill’s own views on moral theory, though, one must take a 
considerably wider view of Mill’s works in moral philosophy. If Jacobson is correct, 
Utilitarianism has no special precedence over Mill’s claims in his other writings. In fact, 
given that the book may arguably be aimed at a popular audience, there may be good 
reason for taking his claims there less seriously than one does in his arguments 
elsewhere.     
This thesis will be aimed at establishing the proper historical and ideological 
context for reading Utilitarianism. That context, it will be argued, is much more closely 
aligned with Jacobson’s interpretation than Crisp’s. While it is true that Utilitarianism 
represents Mill’s last piece of sustained commentary on moral philosophy, there is a 
good deal of evidence to support Jacobson’s argument for an ecumenical reading of the 
                                                 
6 Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism , 7-8.   
 5 
document. That said, Jacobson’s reading of Utilitarianism is a fairly radical view within 
the field of Mill scholarship and stands in need of elaboration and correction on certain 
key points. Specifically, Jacobson’s article leaves Mill scholarship with the difficulty of 
figuring out exactly what role Utilitarianism should play in the scholarly view of Mill’s 
work. In what follows, this study will present arguments displaying the historical reasons 
for viewing Mill’s last chapter as a place where Mill is speaking more for himself than in 
the earlier chapters. 
The structure of this thesis is organized around correcting Crisp’s historical 
narrative for the development of Mill’s thought and supporting the historical evidence 
for Jacobson’s views. In the second chapter, there is a brief discussion of the 
organization and general outline of Utilitarianism, a description of the position that 
Crisp takes in justifying his interpretation of the importance of Utilitarianism for Mill’s 
moral theory, and finally an outline of the important points of Jacobson’s article 
critiquing Crisp’s position. As will be apparent, it is necessary to say a few things about 
how Utilitarianism is organized and describe some of its arguments. This will allow the 
reader to see what is at stake in the dispute between the two camps, and to observe what 
continuities and discontinuities are present in Utilitarianism when compared to Mill’s 
other works. Though it should be clear where the interpretations disagree with one 
another, this discussion will not provide a sustained case for the superiority of 
Jacobson’s position—though that is the view defended by the thesis as a whole.  
The third chapter of the thesis is concerned with providing the appropriate 
historical context for reading Utilitarianism. It discusses the intellectual history 
 6 
surrounding the origins of utilitarianism as a philosophical position, Mill’s other writings 
on utilitarianism throughout his life, Mill’s correspondence as it relates to the document 
and his intentions for its publication, his evaluation of the work following its publication, 
a historiographical overview of prominent biographical treatments of Mill, and finally, 
an analysis of some of the initial reactions to Mill’s views. This chapter will include a 
topical rather than chronological discussion of these issues. The objective of the chapter 
will be to supply the proper resources to argue forcefully with Crisp in the third chapter.  
The fourth and final chapter serves two aims. The first is to make clear precisely 
how the evidence in the second chapter is generally supportive of Jacobson’s position 
and provides further evidence against Crisp’s. This is done by giving a concise overview 
of the evidence presented in favor of the revisionist position. The second aim is to 
explore the implications of the findings of this study for the future of Mill research. 
Ultimately, there is an argument that further attention should be given to Chapter V of 
Utilitarianism, given that Mill seems to be expressing his own views there more than in 
the other chapters.   
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CHAPTER II 
UTILITARIANISM, ORTHODOXY, AND REVISIONISM 
 
The Structure of the Work Titled “Utilitarianism”  
 Before describing the various positions taken with respect to how the work has 
been interpreted and its varied status in the importance of Mill’s work, it is worth saying 
a few words about the overall structure and content of Utilitarianism. The objective here 
is to familiarize the reader with the general structure of the book and to highlight its 
most important arguments, without taking a stance as to the best interpretation or 
ultimate implications of particular passages in the book.   
Though one often speaks of the distinct chapters of Utilitarianism as they were 
given in the volumes under that title published in Mill’s lifetime, it is important to note 
that the first and second chapters were published in October, the third and fourth in 
November, and the fifth in December 1861. Though Mill eventually published all the 
chapters together, it will be argued later that some of the differences between the 
chapters may be indicative of a different kind of intention for the second and third 
installments as compared to the first. That said, Mill did not make much in the way of 
radical changes to the published version in Fraser’s when the book was published in 
1863. According to John Robson, the editor of the Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 
“Mill’s opinions were quite stable by the time Utilitarianism appeared, and though there 
is a decade between the periodical publication in 1861 and the appearance in 1871 of the 
4th edition (the last in Mill’s lifetime, and so used here as a copy-text), there are only 
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seventy-four substantive variants (1.35 per page of this edition).7 Out of this seventy-
four, eight may be interpreted as change of opinion or fact, one indicates the passage of 
time, twenty-two are qualifications of one kind or another, and the remaining alterations 
were minor verbal changes.8 The most substantial changes came in Mill’s fifth chapter, 
where Mill clarified a number of his arguments concerning the etymology of the term 
‘justice.’  
 Mill’s opening chapter serves to set the agenda for the rest of the book by 
discussing the state of moral philosophy in order to establish certain points of 
methodology common to utilitarianism that differentiate it from other moral theories. 
Mill notes that though philosophers have been arguing about the most basic questions of 
moral theory since they began arguing about philosophy in any form, there are still very 
few solid conclusions upon which philosophers are widely agreed. This continual 
disagreement, Mill thinks, is troubling for two common approaches to ethics: moral 
faculty theorists and a priori moral theorists. The former, of whom William Whewell 
would be one example, insist that moral norms are discerned through a kind of moral 
faculty common to all humans.9 An a priori moral theory, a position Mill associates with 
                                                 
7 John Robson, “Textual Introduction” in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. X, Essays 
on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. John Robson (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1985), cxxv. 
Hereafter, volumes in the Collected Works will be identified as ‘CW’ with the relevant Roman numeral 
given (e.g., Mill, CW, X, cxxv). Following the convention in Mill scholarship, the exceptions to this will 
be references to Utilitarianism and On Liberty, which will be identified by U and OL, respectively, along 
with numbers indicating chapter and paragraph (e.g., U, 1.2). Utilitarianism can be found in vol. X and On 
Liberty in vol. XVIII.       
8 Ibid. 
9 Whewell served as Mill’s foil in a variety of philosophic disputes beyond the bounds of moral 
theory. A sustained engagement with Whewell’s moral theory can be found in “Whewell on Moral 
Philosophy” CW, X, 165-202. For a work engaging the debate between these two figures (with an 
especially charitable view of Whewell) see Laura Snyder, Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on 
Science and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).  
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Kant, argues that the dictates of morality may be deduced from an analysis of the 
meaning of moral terms. For both views, since morality can be known to all agents 
through the use of the moral faculty or the use of reason, the continual disagreement on 
the most basic moral questions raises, in Mill’s view, doubts about the soundness of 
these views.10 This disagreement, though, is not surprising to Mill given his 
methodology in moral theory. Mill associates himself with what he calls the inductive 
school of ethics, which says that morality is something learned through observation and 
experience and is thus going to be known and understood differently by individuals with 
different levels of moral education and experience. 
 In the course of the chapter Mill also promises to “contribute something towards 
the understanding and appreciation of the Utilitarian or Happiness theory, and toward 
such proof as it is susceptible of.”11 While admitting that questions of “ultimate ends” 
are not amenable to proof in the normal sense of the word (e.g., up to the standards of a 
geometric proof), it is enough to present it in a way that should command assent from 
those who will consider it using their rational faculties in line with their experiences. 
 The second chapter is arguably the most famous in the book and contains some 
of Mill’s most oft-cited passages on the nature of utilitarianism, including his discussion 
of the greatest happiness principle, higher and lower pleasures, and notable responses to 
common objections to utilitarianism. After making some comments on the origins of the 
                                                 
10 That said, Mill does not take his arguments in this first chapter to be decisive, and he engages 
with these approaches to morality at great length elsewhere.  
11Mill, U, 1.5.   
 10 
term ‘utilitarianism’ and clearing up some common confusions as to its usage, Mill gives 
one of the most famous claims in the history of utilitarian theory:  
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By 
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, 
and the privation of pleasure.12 
 
As many commentators have noted, and as will be subsequently discussed, this 
statement makes Mill sound very much like his utilitarian predecessor Jeremy Bentham. 
In his introduction to the volume in the Collected Works, F.E.L. Priestly writes, “The 
creed, as a confession of faith, is to be totally orthodox. He and Bentham are of the same 
faith. The difference is to lie in the exegesis.”13 One key part of the exegesis concerns 
Mill’s notion of happiness and, more specifically, pleasure.14 According to a common 
reading of Jeremy Bentham, pleasure could be described as something which admitted 
quantitative but not qualitative distinctions. Bentham thought that pleasures arising from 
various activities (e.g., chatting with friends, eating ice cream sundaes, going for long 
walks) were all qualitatively the same but differed only in how we might measure them 
                                                 
12Ibid., 2.2.  
13 F.E.L. Priestly, “Introduction” in Utilitarianism, CW, X, xli.    
14 The question of Mill’s views on happiness is one of the more contested ones in Mill 
scholarship and this study will not put forth anything like a comprehensive view on the topic. Some Mill 
scholars take Mill to believe that happiness should be thought of as pleasure where pleasure is taken to be 
some kind of mental state that is inherently valuable. This view can be found in Crisp, Guidebook to 
Utilitarianism, 25–28 and Dale Miller J. S. Mill: Moral, Social and Political Thought, (Polity, Cambridge 
2010. 2010), 31–53. Some, though, think this is mistaken and that Mill simply equates happiness with 
pleasure as in the case of Fred Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political 
Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Still others think that 
happiness for Mill is not a mental state at all and on Mill’s view value is inherent in activities; see Ben 
Saunders “J. S. Mill’s Conception of Utility,” Utilitas 22 (2010): 54-56. Lastly, David Brink argues when 
speaking of happiness Mill means activities, states, and abilities; see David Brink “Mill’s Deliberative 
Utilitarianism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992): 78.  
 11 
according to various factors like intensity, duration, and fecundity.15 Mill, in contrast, 
argues that some pleasures are in fact incomparable to one another, such that “some 
kinds of pleasures are more desirable and more valuable than others,” regardless of the 
quantities involved.16 These pleasures are those that engage humans’ “higher faculties” 
which, he says, can supply certain higher pleasures like those enjoyed in the course of 
philosophical discussion. Mill notes that these capacities may come at the expense of 
having to experience some sorrows, but since these higher pleasures are in certain 
respects incomparable to lower ones, this is allowable under the theory of utilitarianism. 
These considerations lead him to another oft-quoted passage from this chapter: 
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a 
different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. 
The other part to the comparison knows both sides.17 
 
Though Mill’s argument and clarifications for these points are interesting, for now let it 
suffice to say that these points are taken by many scholars to imply some kind of break 
with Bentham’s version of utilitarianism. 
The rest of chapter two is taken up with responding to various objections to 
utilitarianism. Two of these objections in particular will be especially important later and 
foreshadow some of the debates that are important for understanding how best to 
interpret the document as a whole. The first concerns the objection that utilitarianism is 
                                                 
15 At one place in his writing Bentham actually distinguishes fourteen kind s of pleasure and 
twelve kinds of pain. See chapter five of Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996).  
16 Mill, U, 2.4. 
17Ibid., 2.6  
 12 
too demanding a doctrine and would require too radical a change in human nature to be 
plausible: 
[Some critics] say it is exacting too much to require that people always act from 
the inducement of promoting standard of morals, and to confound the rule of 
action with the motive of it.  It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our 
duties, or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics requires that 
the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-
nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so 
done, if the rule of duty does not condemn them.18       
 
Here Mill insists that motives, strictly speaking, are not relevant to determining the 
rightness or wrongness of an action. This is true, even, as he imagines it, in the case of 
saving someone from drowning for less than noble motives. “He who saves his fellow 
creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the 
hope of being paid for his trouble . . . .”19 This question over precisely how demanding  
utilitarianism really is for agents is one that survives even in present debates concerning 
utilitarianism, and the best interpretation of Mill on this point is similarly fraught.20  
 Another important objection Mill responds to concerns the objection that if 
morality is about bringing about the best consequences in terms of overall human 
happiness, this seems to require one to spend a good deal of time calculating the 
potential outcomes of various events. This prospect of endless calculation seems to 
render the theory implausible. In response, Mill writes:  
                                                 
18 Mill, U, 2.19.  
19 Ibid. 
20 In his commentary on Utilitarianism, Crisp writes “this paragraph  and the footnote added by 
Mill in the 2nd edition, [where Mill gave some further classificatory remarks on the case of the drowning 
person and some objections in light of an objection a reader raised] are among the most complex passages 
in Utilitarianism.” Crisp, Utilitarianism, 120. To choose but a few of the more recent treatments of this 
question (with diverging answers) see Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2000), ch. 8; Dale Jamieson and Robert Elliot, “Progressive Consequentialism,” Philosophical 
Perspectives, 23 (2009): 241–251. 
 13 
This is exactly as if any one were to say that it is impossible to guide our 
conduct by Christianity, because there is not time, on every occasion on which 
anything has to be done, to read through the Old and New Testaments. The 
answer to the objection is that there has been ample time, namely, the whole past 
duration of the human species. During all that time, mankind have been learning 
by experience the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence, as 
well as all the morality of life, are dependent.21 
 
All of these experiences, both those of the subject and those of others, provide the “rules 
of morality” which a subject’s upbringing and society allow one to follow. These rules, 
which Mill thinks are generally consistent with the demands of utilitarianism, are not 
final and may be improved upon (recall Mill’s discussion concerning the inductive 
school of ethics) in light of further experiences. In other words, accepting the principle 
of utility does not mean that one cannot rely on the wisdom of others to be implemented. 
In two memorable examples he explains:  
To inform a traveler respecting the pace of his ultimate destination is not to 
forbid the use of landmarks and direction-posts on the way. . . . Nobody argues 
that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy because sailors cannot wait 
to calculate the Nautical Almanack. Being rational creatures, they go to sea with 
it ready calculated; and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their 
minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong. . . .22 
 
The special controversy with Mill’s responses here concerns the question of whether he 
is espousing the view that the best way to follow the demands of utilitarianism is in the 
following of rules (e.g., stick to the landmarks and direct posts) or in bringing about the 
greatest amount of happiness in each action regardless of what the rules demand.23 
 Situated between two of the most famous (and infamous) chapters in utilitarian  
                                                 
21 Mill, U, 2.24. 
22 Ibid. 
23 The best review of the literature can be found in Alan Fuchs, “Mill’s Theory of a Morally 
Correct Action,” in The Blackwell Guide to Mill’s Utilitarianism, 139-159. 
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moral theory, chapter three of Utilitarianism—in which Mill discusses the theory of 
sanctions and moral psychology—stands as perhaps the least commented upon chapter 
in the whole book.24 In this chapter, Mill seeks to answer the question of why someone 
ought to follow the dictates of utilitarianism. In particular, Mill seems worried about 
what can be said to the person who would question the norms of utilitarianism and 
instead follow his own self-interest. “He says to himself, I feel that I am bound not to rob 
or murder, betray or deceive; but why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If 
my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference?”25 
He asks, what are the sanctions—the sources of pleasure and pain—that will make 
utilitarianism evident to this person?26 Mill seems to vacillate in this chapter between 
whether this question is ultimately about motivation or authority. The motivational 
question surrounding sanctions concerns the extent to which one is actually motivated to 
act in accordance with the dictates of utilitarianism, and the extent to which this 
motivation might be improved or go into decline. The authority question surrounding 
sanctions concerns the extent to which there is a sufficient account of why one has good 
reason to take up the demands of utilitarianism. Mill does not really give sufficient 
                                                 
24 Consider the following representative quotes from notable Mill scholars: “Chapter 3 of 
Utilitarianism—Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility”—has received markedly less 
attention than those immediately preceding and succeeding it.” Crisp, Utilitarianism, 27; “In what is 
probably the most understudied chapter of Utilitarianism (ch. III) Mill addresses the question of the 
ultimate sanction of the principle of utility.” David Brink "Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy" in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 1997-. Article published Fall 2008. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/mill-moral-political/; “Mill’s theory of sanctions, and 
his understanding of the psychology of human action more generally, are among the least-discussed 
elements of his utilitarianism.” Dale Miller “Mill’s Theory of Sanctions” in The Blackwell Guide to 
Utilitarianism , ed. Henry West (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 171.  
25 Mill, U, 3.1. 
26 For a thorough discussion on Mill’s usage of the term ‘sanction’ and a comparison of its usage 
in Bentham and John Austin see Dale Miller, “Mill’s Theory of Sanctions,” 159-173.  
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answers to either of these questions in this chapter. Instead, he seems more focused on 
discussing the different kinds of sanctions and their origins as well as how the difficult 
questions surrounding sanctions are ones that apply to all moral theories and not just 
utilitarianism.    
 The most important distinction for Mill in this chapter is his distinction between 
external and internal sanctions. External sanctions are “the hope of favour and the fear of 
displeasure” that one may receive from one’s fellow beings, distributed individually or 
collectively, or from God.27 These might include penalties imposed by the laws of a 
state, the social exclusion resulting from disfavor in a community, or (if such things 
exist) divine punishment delivered at Judgment Day. Mill’s discussion of external 
sanctions, though, is fairly brief and he seems more concerned about the nature of our 
internal sanctions. The one he focuses on is what people typically identify as the pangs 
of their conscience. One’s conscience is a “mass of feeling which must be broken 
through in order to do what violates our standard of right, and which, if we do 
nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the 
form of remorse.”28 Mill is interested in exploring whether one’s conscience is innate or 
acquired (he claims he believes the latter) as well as its nature and composition. Mill 
claims that his opponents, the moral intuitionists, believe that it is innate. Mill’s view is 
that the capacity for conscience might be innate but its actual content will be shaped to a 
large extent by one’s surroundings and, like all human faculties, can be corrupted or 
almost extinguished through bad training and ill use. Perhaps most important, for Mill, is 
                                                 
27 Mill, U, 3.3. 
28 Mill, U, 3.4.  
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the idea that conscience can be shaped by society to be in accordance with utilitarian 
standards. That is to say, Mill believes that with proper training of the sentiments, one’s 
conscience might come to align with the utilitarian standard of morality, and Mill’s 
vision is for a whole society of individuals whose collective consciences respond in this 
way.  
 Mill’s fourth chapter is very brief but has nonetheless attracted a great deal of 
attention from critics of utilitarianism—perhaps because of its provocative title “Of what 
sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible.” The principle of utility for which 
Mill is offering a “proof” here is the claim that happiness is desirable and, it being the 
only thing which is desirable, all other things are only desirable as a means to it.29 As 
Henry West has written, “The argument in the twelve paragraphs of Chapter IV, if 
successful, is one of the most important arguments in all of moral philosophy, for it 
would establish hedonism, in the broad meaning that Mill attaches to pleasure, as the 
value foundation for all of life and for morality as a part of that.”30 As will be discussed 
in a later section on the early reception of Utilitarianism, many commentators think that 
Mill’s “proof” fails for one reason or another, and many think that Mill stumbles very 
badly indeed in this chapter.31 Recently, some prominent philosophers have mounted 
                                                 
29 To review the controversy on what counts as Mill’s principle here see D.G. Brown “What is 
Mill’s Principle of Utility?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3, 1-12. 
30 Henry West, “Mill’s ‘Proof’ of the Principle of Utility,” in The Blackwell Guide to 
Utilitarianism, ed. Henry West (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 175.  
31 For the early history on criticism of this chapter see Steve Gerard, “Desire and Desirability: 
Bradley, Russell and Moore versus Mill,” in Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, ed. 
W.W. Tait (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1997), 37-74. 
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spirited attempts at defending Mill’s argument and charge many of Mill’s critics with 
rampant misreading and seriously uncharitable interpretations.32  
As with other controversies in the Utilitarianism, this study will avoid 
philosophical exegesis of the chapter and Mill’s sometimes confusing argument, and 
instead offer what are often taken to be the key points of the chapter in a way that is as 
non-partisan as possible. The first argument here concerns Mill’s claims that the 
utilitarian doctrine of happiness is desirable and that, in this theory, anything desirable is 
so only to the extent that it is desired to that end. To argue for this, though, he requires a 
“proof” that happiness is desired in this sense. Mill’s notion of “proof” seems to be in 
the sense of “proof” by way of psychological introspection rather than in the sense of a 
tight logical or geometric case. In this spirit, Mill begins his proof by noting that just as 
the proof of sound is that it is audible and that something is visible is that people see it, 
“In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is 
desirable, is that people do actually desire it.”33 This may seem obvious enough, but one 
might ask how this relates to the “general happiness” that is often appealed to by the 
utilitarian moral theorists. To this he writes that each person has his or her own 
happiness that stands as a good to that person and the general happiness is nothing more 
than an aggregate of all of those private goods. This does not mean, as some have 
claimed, that Mill is arguing that in one person’s desiring her good that she desires the 
good for all (this would be fallacy of composition). What it does mean is that when we 
                                                 
32 See Elijah Millgram “Mill’s Proof of the Principle of Utility” Ethics 110 (2000), 282-310; and 
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, “Mill’s ‘Proof’ of the Principle of Utility: A More than Half-Hearted Defense,” 
Social Philosophy & Policy, 18 (2001): 330-360.  
33 Mill, U, 4.3. 
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identify what the aggregate of a number of individuals is, we will be able to identify 
happiness as one of the constituent parts.34     
With this much established Mill now must try to argue that even those things that 
seem to be desired in themselves, apart from happiness, are actually only a part of 
happiness since that is the only thing that can be good in itself. Mill admits that it seems 
as if people desire things like virtue or friendship in and of themselves. To counter this 
Mill appeals to his reader’s sense of introspection: asking her if she really desires these 
things irrespective of the pleasure or pain that accompanies such things. The desire of a 
thing, such as virtue, “is not a different thing from the desire of happiness, any more than 
the love of music, or the desire of health. They are included in happiness.”35 Pleasures 
and pains seem to accompany the desires one has for any thing in life, which makes 
aiming at any of those things an aim, at least indirectly, at happiness. Thus, things like 
friendship or virtue are actually a part of happiness, which is precisely what Mill set out 
to “prove” in the first place. Again, this is far from a fully adequate reconstruction of 
Mill’s proof, as such a construction would go beyond the scope of what is appropriate 
here. What is important, though, is that one can see Mill seriously attempting to answer 
questions concerning the importance of the principle of utility (a theory concerning the 
nature of value) for a general theory of utilitarianism (a theory concerning proper 
conduct in light of that value). As in earlier chapters, Mill’s arguments follow the pattern 
of aligning himself with the inductive approach to moral questions, appealing to human 
                                                 
34 For Mill’s clarification of this question see Mill to Henry Jones, 13 June 1868, CW, XVI, 1414. 
35 Mill, U, 4.6.  
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experience (in this case introspection) as the arbiter of philosophical questions rather 
than the a priori methods of his philosophical opponents.   
Mill’s fifth and final chapter is the longest in the book and is especially 
concerned with questions regarding justice and its compatibility with the utilitarian 
morality. Once again, Mill’s discussion is centered on combatting his intuitionist 
opponents who view the concept of justice as something fundamentally opposed to 
utilitarianism. Humans, Mill admits, do seem to have an immediate reaction to correct 
perceived injustices. Furthermore, the corrective actions motivated by justice are often 
undertaken without regard to whether such actions result in the raising of the general 
happiness or similar utilitarian goals. That said, Mill claims, this fact does not legitimize 
our actions and the sentiments that drive them. “If we have intellectual instincts leading 
us to judge in a particular way, as well as animal instincts that prompt us to act in a 
particular way, there is no necessity that the former should be more infallible in their 
sphere than the latter in theirs: it may as well happen that wrong judgments are 
occasionally suggested by those, as wrong actions by these.”36  
Mill’s task, then, is to try to explain the human idea of justice and determine 
whether it is a sui generis normative concept apart from the utilitarian framework, or 
whether it can be somehow explained and incorporated into utilitarianism itself. He does 
this by breaking down the various spheres of justice (legal rights, moral rights, desert, 
contracts, impartiality, equality) and offering his own analysis of the etymology of the 
term ‘justice,’ which culminates in his claim that legal constraint is the “generating idea 
                                                 
36 Mill, U, 5.2. 
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of the notion of justice.”37 This, then, leads him to one of the most important points of 
the chapter where he connects the notion of punishment to his moral theory more 
generally: “We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought 
to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, but the opinion of his 
fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.”38 In Mill’s 
view, to have a right to something is to be able to exact a corresponding duty from 
someone; just as, to use his language, we might exact a debt from that person. If 
something is not punishable, then, it is not within the bounds of morality. To make this 
point even more forcibly Mill writes:   
I think there is no doubt that this distinction lies at the bottom of the notions of  
right and wrong; that we call any conduct wrong, or employ, instead, some other  
term of dislike or disparagement, according as we think that the person ought, or  
ought not, to be punished for it; and we say, it would be right, to do so and so, or  
merely that it would be desirable or laudable, according as we would wish to see  
the person whom it concerns, compelled, or only persuaded and exhorted, to act  
in that manner.39 
 
Mill closes his discussion of this part of the chapter by noting that these remarks indicate 
how justice and morality generally are distinct from other kinds of norms present in 
human affairs: “The remaining provinces of Expediency and Worthiness.”40 Most 
commentators take this to be Mill’s way of referring to his notion of the Art of Life, 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 5.12. Interestingly, Mill’s etymological discussion of justice as an occasional tool of the 
powerful to systematize oppression has some connections to Marx’s notion of bourgeois justice in the 
German Ideology, though it does not appear that Mill had read this in Marx. For an interesting discussion 
on Mill’s knowledge of Marx see Lewis Feuer, “John Stuart Mill and Marxian Socialism” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 10 (1949), 297-303.      
38 Mill, U, 5.14. Jacobson sees this as a tremendously important comment in justifying his 
interpretation of Mill’s considered moral view. See his Daniel Jacobson “Utilitarianism without 
Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill,” Philosophical Review, esp., 185-188. For an alternative 
interpretation of the passage see Crisp’s notes in his annotated edition of Utilitarianism, 140-142.    
39 Mill, U, 5.14. 
40 Ibid., 5.15.  
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whereby Mill distinguishes those areas of human conduct that are subject to the norms of 
morality, prudence, and aesthetics.41 This is noteworthy in that it represents a theme that 
Mill develops in his other works (e.g., “Bentham” and System of Logic) and offers  a 
special point of departure from the views of other utilitarians; thus marking this section 
of the book especially non-ecumenical.  
 The remaining part of the chapter is concerned with Mill discussing the 
sentiment of justice and how it can be made compatible with utilitarianism. He presents 
the view that the human sentiment of justice consists of both the desire to punish 
someone who has done harm and the belief that there is some definitive individual who 
has been harmed. Both of these, he thinks, are natural outgrowths of our animal nature, 
our impulse for self-defense, and our feelings of sympathy for our fellow creatures. This 
last quality, Mill notes, differs from animals in matter of degree since our intelligence 
allows us to extend our sympathies far beyond the bounds of those of animals. 
Interestingly, he thinks that this sentiment, like other sentiments that might be initially 
inclined to be partial only to ourselves and those immediately around us, can be shaped 
by society so as to be concerned for the general good and persons beyond our immediate 
purview. With this context in place he introduces his theory of rights and its connection 
to general utility: 
To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to 
defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask, why it ought? I can 
                                                 
41 For the best short treatment on this topic see Alan Ryan, “John Stuart Mill’s Art of Living,” in 
J.S. Mill On Liberty in Focus eds. John Gray and G.W. Smith (New York: Routledge, 1991), 162-168. A 
recent edited collection of essays related to understanding this important topic can be found in Ben 
Eggleston, Dale Miller, David Weinstein eds., John Stuart Mill and the Art of Life (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010.) 
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give him no other reason than general utility. If that expression does not seem to 
convey a sufficient feeling of the strength of the obligation, nor to account for the 
peculiar energy of the feeling, it is because there goes to the composition of the 
sentiment, not a rational only, but also an animal element, the thirst for 
retaliation; and this thirst derives its intensity, as well as its moral justification, 
from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is 
concerned. The interest involved is that of security, to every one's feelings the 
most vital of all interests.42 
 
This is an important passage for at least two reasons. First, it connects the 
discussion of justice and the human desire to punish wrong with some definite wrong 
that is expressible in terms of rights. Secondly—and this is the more important one of 
the two—this connects Mill’s theory of rights here with his utilitarian theory more 
generally, which indicates his desire to offer some coherent system of rights within a 
utilitarian context. Compare the statement on how he justifies rights where he says, “I 
can give him no other reason than general utility,” with his statement in On Liberty 
where he is discussing the nature of rights and its connection with the utilitarian 
morality:  
It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my  
argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility. I regard  
utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the  
largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive  
being.43 
 
In both Utilitarianism and On Liberty, Mill makes it clear that he wants to offer a 
utilitarian account that can make sense of ideas like rights. In a discussion of rights, Mill 
argues, one finds the connection between the sentiments of justice (e.g., the wish to 
punish a wrongdoer) with utilitarian morality since it is for the general good that certain 
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interests be protected. With this connection now made, Mill can close the book. As he 
summarizes it in his last paragraph: 
If this characteristic sentiment has been sufficiently accounted for; if there is no  
necessity to assume for it any peculiarity of origin; if it is simply the natural  
feeling of resentment, moralised by being made coextensive with the demands of  
social good; and if this feeling not only does but ought to exist in all the classes  
of cases to which the idea of justice corresponds; that idea no longer presents  
itself as a stumbling-block to the utilitarian ethics.44 
 
Crisp’s Orthodox Account  
 
  This section will discuss one possible way of interpreting Mill’s intentions for 
the work Utilitarianism. The first consideration examines Crisp’s arguments as they are 
given in his guidebook to Mill’s Utilitarianism, where he offers a concise and pointed 
treatment of Mill’s life and the context in which Utilitarianism was written. The most 
important point in Crisp’s interpretative approach is his attempt to portray Utilitarianism 
as the last step in a life-long march in defense of Mill’s unique brand of utilitarianism. 
Crisp’s argument for this will be given in three parts. First, he offers a brief sketch of 
Mill’s intellectual biography, which is summarized below. Second, he considers the 
themes present in Utilitarianism that occur in earlier writings. Third, he discusses some 
of the difficulties of interpreting Utilitarianism more generally and explains how he 
handles some of the difficult passages for his position.  
 One of the strongest rhetorical points for Crisp’s view is that a look at Mill’s 
biography reveals the fact that after the publication of Utilitarianism Mill turned to other 
projects like completing his Autobiography, running for political office, and engaging 
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the political controversies of his day—a task that led him to publish another of his more 
famous works On the Subjection of Women. Crisp’s task, then, is to portray Mill as 
engaging a kind of teleological ascent toward the publication of Utilitarianism in 
Fraser’s:  
In so far as Mill was an evangelist, Utilitarianism . . . can be seen as his bible.  
Though it was not written in the high and polished style of On Liberty or The  
Subjection of Women, it was clearly intended to be the summation, and defence,  
of his thoughts on the doctrine which provided the foundation for his views in  
other areas. 45 
  
Crisp describes Mill’s early life as one vigorously formed by his father, James 
Mill, who dreamt of creating the consummate utilitarian scholar and activist. According 
to his Autobiography, James Mill provided John Stuart with a shockingly rigorous 
education in the classics of Greek and Latin (in the original languages), mathematics, the 
natural sciences, political economy, history, and literature. Alongside his rigorous 
reading schedule, Mill was allowed to interact with his father’s friends Jeremy Bentham 
and David Ricardo, both of whom had tremendous impact on Mill’s thinking (just as 
Mill is often portrayed as developing utilitarianism one step further than Bentham so 
also is he often portrayed as bringing Ricardo’s theories of political economy to a further 
stage of development of his Principles of Political Economy). His father also arranged 
for Mill to get a job working at the East India Company (where he, James Mill, was 
Chief Examiner), a position that provided Mill with a stable income and a work schedule 
that allowed much time for intellectual work and conversation.   
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 In his Autobiography, Mill writes that one of the key turning points of his young 
life was in 1821 when he began studying with the famous jurist John Austin who gave 
him a careful education in utilitarianism as it applied to English law. Through Austin, he 
came to better appreciate the nuances of the theory, such that when he finally picked up 
a French version of Bentham’s Treatise on Legislation and read it carefully, the 
experience served as a culmination for his utilitarian education. Though he had, of 
course, been educated within the principles of Bentham’s views, he had actually read 
very little of the man himself. Thus, when he began to study the work carefully his views 
took on a more mature outlook:  
It gave unity to my conceptions of things. I now had opinions; a creed, a  
doctrine, a philosophy; in one (and the best) sense of the word, a religion; the  
inculcation and diffusion of which could be made the principal outward aim of a  
life.46 
 
Crisp writes that Mill, from this moment on, “never abandoned the greatest happiness 
principle,” and one of the first actions he undertook following his revelatory reading of 
Bentham was to found a society that he dubbed the Utilitarian Society, which met in a 
room at Bentham’s house fortnightly over the next three years. Aside from this group, 
Mill was also involved in the larger intellectual movements of his day, writing critical 
articles for the Westminster Review, participating in the London Debating Society, and 
joining a group of intellectuals and political activists known as the Philosophical 
Radicals. In 1830, in part through these associations, Mill met his future wife Harriet 
Taylor; a woman whom Mill believed to be a genius and who provided Mill with, as he 
labels a chapter in his Autobiography, the most valuable friendship of his life.  
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Though Mill and Harriet quickly fell in love, they faced a considerable obstacle 
in that she was already married to a wealthy druggist named John Taylor with whom she 
shared two children. Eventually, Mill and Harriet decided to maintain what many believe 
to be a chaste but very intense friendship until John Taylor died in 1849, allowing them 
to marry two years later. It was in the  years following their marriage that Mill first 
mentioned, in a letter that will be further discussed later, his plans of publishing a series 
of essays on, among other topics, ‘Liberty,’ ‘Foundations of Morals,’ and ‘Family,’ 
which have come down to readers, respectively, as On Liberty (1859), Utilitarianism 
(1861), and the Subjection of Women (1869).    
At this point Crisp shifts into the second part of his analysis, where he examines 
particular themes present in Utilitarianism that had been developed in earlier works. To 
that end, he includes a discussion of Mill’s earlier work that criticizes the intuitionist 
approach to moral philosophy, citing Mill’s 1835 critique of the intuitionist Adam 
Sedgwick, who argued that right and wrong are inexplicable facts perceived by a special 
moral faculty called moral sense. He also cites Mill’s penchant (evidenced in the 
Sedgwick piece, his 1833 essay “Remarks on Bentham,” and his essay on William 
Whewell) for mixing up normative and metaethical/epistemological claims made by 
intuitionists. That is to say, Mill sometimes conflates questions of what we are to do in 
our moral lives with the question of how we find out what we are to do in our moral 
lives. As we have seen, intuitionism is especially concerned with how one finds out 
about morality, though Mill was constantly accusing intuitionists of merely matching 
their intuitions with conservative moral views, which they then dressed up with 
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expansive metaphysical language in order to formally criticize a progressive morality 
like utilitarianism. In the first and third chapters of Utilitarianism, Mill occasionally 
talks in this way, though in chapter three we also find a passage where he acknowledges 
the potential compatibility between an intuitionist ethics and an ethics that recognizes 
the greatest happiness principle.47    
Crisp also highlights the continuity between Utilitarianism and earlier works that 
discuss Mill’s conception of first and secondary principles. On Crisp’s reading, 
utilitarianism has as its first principle the objective of raising general happiness, even if 
this means adopting secondary principles that might not always be perfectly consistent 
with the first (recall Mill’s discussion of signposts in chapter two of Utilitarianism). 
That is, we might adopt secondary principles like “do not lie” even if this is not always 
compatible with the first principle. In an 1833 attack on the intuitionist William Blakey, 
Mill remarked that engaging in debates about first principles was not especially 
important since first principles, as they are usually given, are too abstract to translate 
into practice.48 Yet, as he continued to develop his views in his System of Logic he came 
to see the importance of first principles, since they are needed to solve conflicts between 
first and secondary principles. One sees this shift toward the importance of first 
principles in his System of Logic and later attacks on intuitionists, all of which presages 
Mill’s discussion of the “proof” offered in chapter four of Utilitarianism.  
  Crisp also sees continuity in intellectual development concerning Mill’s views on 
character, happiness, and moral motivation. In his Remarks on Bentham, Mill criticizes 
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48 Mill, “Blakely’s History of Moral Science” CW, X. 29. 
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Bentham for failing to understand the importance of character and the training of the 
sentiments.49 On Mill’s view, while actions are what ultimately matter for utilitarianism, 
training the sentiments will lead to greater happiness overall for the agent. Mill claims 
that Bentham overlooks the importance of this training of the sentiments. In another 
essay on Bentham, Mill writes that Bentham’s mistake in this matter comes as a result of 
the author’s poor cultivation in the arts. “Mill saw Bentham as a child with a child’s 
limited imagination, and believed that the most importance sources of happiness lay in 
the adult world of noble morality and arts.”50 According to Crisp, any reading of Mill’s 
discussion of higher and lower pleasures in chapter two of Utilitarianism should be read 
with this criticism of Bentham firmly in mind. Similarly, Mill was critical of Bentham in 
the latter’s account of moral motivation. In both of his essays on Bentham, Mill points 
out that Bentham omits the motivations of duty and conscience when listing the “springs 
of action” for human behavior. It was this kind of oversight, Mill notes, that intuitionists 
like Whewell latched onto in claiming that utilitarians forced the individual to choose 
between the callings of human happiness and moral duty.51 Crisp notes that it was only 
two years after his publication critiquing Whewell that Mill began working on 
Utilitarianism, and, in chapter three, Mill suggests that the kind of dilemma imagined by 
Whewell is a false one.  
 As Crisp interprets Mill, there is a great deal of continuity between Mill’s earlier 
works and his claims in Utilitarianism. The exception, as Crisp admits, seems to be the 
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fifth chapter of Utilitarianism on justice which only contains a few sections tied to 
earlier works (e.g., the discussion of the Art of Life from “Bentham”). He acknowledges 
that the fifth chapter was written separately and that Mill does not do much to tie it to 
earlier parts of the work.  
 The third part of Crisp’s argument concerning Mill’s intentions for Utilitarianism 
concerns some of the special difficulties involved in interpreting Mill’s philosophical 
rhetoric. The difficulty in interpreting Mill, Crisp suggests, is that the ultimate goal for 
Mill is to support the greatest happiness principle; an objective that might involve less 
than straightforward advocacy.  In his essay on Sedgwick, Mill is very careful to 
elucidate the difference between the truth of a claim and its effect on the reader; a theme 
he continues in “Remarks on Bentham” where he criticizes Bentham’s professed view 
that self-interest takes priority over concern for the common good. Mill offers this 
criticism not necessarily because of the falsity of Bentham’s claims, but because of the 
claims’ potentially negative effect on readers.52 Ethical writings, Mill claims, are best 
able to raise the general happiness by inspiring those readers who are undecided as to 
whether they will follow the dictates of self-interest or benevolence, and general utility 
will likely be raised if one can encourage this reader to follow the latter. In his 
Autobiography, Mill writes that his work at the East India Company taught him a good 
deal about persuading people to accept his views and presenting his thought in such a 
way that “gives it easiest admittance into minds not prepared for it by habit.”53  
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In Crisp’s view, all of the above considerations present a challenge in 
interpreting Mill since “on issues of particular ethical importance to him we know that 
he may be attempting to express himself in the way most likely to persuade us, rather 
than to reveal his own views most clearly.”54 In other words, at times Mill may be 
writing to convince rather than elucidate his own views, and it is up to scholars to sort 
out when he is doing which of these tasks. It is for these reasons, Crisp writes, that 
Utilitarianism, in contrast to On Liberty or The Subjection of Women, “was not written 
for widespread public consumption” and explains why Mill gives it little discussion in 
his Autobiography.55 On Liberty and The Subjection of Women, Crisp thinks, concern 
second, rather than first, principles, and thus it is natural to find Mill saying some things 
that may be in tension with many of his claims in Utilitarianism. Then again, Crisp also 
suggests that even within Utilitarianism itself Mill may not be completely forthright 
with his reader. To cite just one example, in his discussion concerning the onerous moral 
commitments of utilitarian morality (which was noted above in the discussion of chapter 
two) Crisp writes that “utilitarianism is almost certainly much more demanding than 
Mill allows. It is tempting to think, in fact, that Mill is deliberately being disingenuous 
here. . . . Better to persuade a reader to become a feeble utilitarian than put them off 
entirely by stressing the demandingness of utilitarian morality.”56  
In summary, Crisp’s orthodox view advocates the view that all of Mill’s life and 
thought point toward the importance of Utilitarianism. One finds Mill taking on the 
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utilitarian mantle early in life and then carrying the project through his relationship with 
Harriet Taylor with whom he planned all of his major works. Also, in Utilitarianism one 
finds many similar topics and modes of argument similar to his earlier works on moral 
philosophy, as well as familiar critiques of Bentham. Lastly, Crisp cites some 
biographical comments from Mill in order to explain certain conceptual difficulties 
within the text. This is done by noting Mill’s admitted tendency to write for rhetorical 
rather than strictly philosophical purposes even in a writing that, Crisp insists, was not 
for popular consumption. 
 
Jacobson’s Revisionism 
As was noted above, Crisp’s interpretation of Mill’s intentions for Utilitarianism 
have largely been accepted by other Mill scholars, insofar as they believe that the 
document represents Mill’s considered view on ethical matters as it developed from his 
earlier writings.  This widespread acceptance is why this view is labeled in this study as 
the orthodox view. Even those who differ in their interpretations of Mill’s moral theory 
typically acknowledge the need to square one’s interpretation with a strict reading of 
Utilitarianism. Standing in contrast is the revisionist view argued for forcefully by 
Daniel Jacobson in his paper “The Diversity of Utilitarianism.” Jacobson’s argument 
challenges the orthodox view and offers a revisionist interpretation. He does this by 
arguing for two claims in particular. First, he argues that Mill’s conception of 
utilitarianism was much broader than is often supposed by many Mill scholars. Second, 
he argues that Mill’s purpose in writing Utilitarianism was to defend a general approach 
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to ethics (i.e., inductive and utilitarian in its largest sense) rather than elucidate his own 
particular theory of morality. Jacobson’s arguments for these points are subtle, 
philosophically complex, and buttressed by a good deal of historical evidence from 
Mill’s correspondence. Given the aims of this thesis, the discussion in this study will 
focus on only those arguments that seem especially pertinent to the historical project, 
and will avoid those debates especially concerned with the finer points in moral theory. 
The focus, then, will be on presenting Jacobson as offering a sharply contrasting 
historical project to Crisp. Whereas Crisp tried to present Utilitarianism as the 
conclusion to a long philosophical development particular to Mill himself, Jacobson tries 
to show how the text reveals a writer especially concerned with presenting a non-
sectarian utilitarian view in order to convince non-utilitarian readers. 
In order to appreciate Jacobson’s arguments it is necessary to say something 
concerning some of the philosophical terminology relevant to the debate here. 
Specifically, here it is necessary to emphasize three different distinctions common in 
discussions about Mill’s moral theory. These distinctions will be helpful to understand 
both Jacobson’s arguments as well as later arguments concerning Mill’s intentions for 
the document Utilitarianism. The first distinction is between direct and indirect theories 
of utilitarianism. David Brink, a noted scholar of Bentham and Mill, explains the 
distinction in his overview of Mill’s moral and political philosophy. Direct utilitarianism 
is the view that, “Any object of moral assessment (e.g., action, motive, policy, or 
institution) should be assessed by and in proportion to the value of its consequences for 
 33 
the general happiness.” 57  Indirect utilitarianism, on the other hand, is the view that, 
“Any object of moral assessment should be assessed, not by the value of its 
consequences for the general happiness, but by its conformity to something else (e.g., 
norms or motives) that has (have) good or optimal acceptance value.”58 In order see the 
meaning of this distinction between two types of utilitarianism, it will help to introduce a 
second distinction that serves as an application of the first distinction. Act-utilitarianism 
is a type of direct utilitarianism which claims that an action is correct insofar as it brings 
about the best consequences available to an agent. Act-utilitarianism is how Crisp 
interprets Mill’s version of the greatest happiness principle. In his commentary on the 
principle Crisp writes that Mill means, “if an action produces happiness, it is—to that 
extent—right and if it produces unhappiness it is to that extent wrong. The right action 
will be that which produces the greatest balance of happiness over unhappiness overall, 
the idea of maximization being implicit in the ‘greatest’ of the ‘greatest happiness 
principle.’”59 In contrast to act-utilitarianism, which is a form of direct utilitarianism 
since it directly weighs the happiness or unhappiness resultant from each act, rule-
utilitarianism is a kind of indirect utilitarianism. Rule-utilitarianism stipulates that 
actions are right to the extent that they conform to some rule whose acceptance brings 
about the greatest amount of general happiness given all of the actions available for a 
given agent. J.O. Urmson and Dale Miller interpret Mill as a rule-utilitarian.60 Rule-
utilitarianism is indirect insofar as an action is evaluated by whether it conforms to the 
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60 See J.O. Urmson, “The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill.” Philosophical 
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appropriate rule (which, of course, is supposed to promote the general happiness) rather 
than whether it raises the level of general happiness directly. There are many other 
versions of utilitarianism besides direct and indirect utilitarianism, though these two are 
probably the most popular ways of interpreting Mill.61   
One further distinction relevant to this discussion concerns the philosophical 
doctrine of hedonism. Hedonism refers to the view that pleasure and pain together 
constitute the sole grounding for value in the world. Other values such as virtue, 
rationality, justice, or piety are not good in themselves but only good insofar as they 
contribute to pleasure. In this context, it is worth noting that utilitarianism, as many 
understand it, is the view that combines hedonism as its theory of what is good along 
with a theory of what is morally right.62      
These distinctions are important for understanding Jacobson’s paper for the 
following two reasons. First, Jacobson claims that Crisp’s interpretation of Mill is 
motivated by the fact that he wishes to interpret Mill as adopting a certain type of direct 
utilitarianism popular among later moral theorists like Henry Sidgwick and R.M. Hare.63 
Jacobson, who favors an indirect interpretation of Mill’s utilitarianism but does not 
argue for it in this paper, wants to show how this desire on Crisp’s part leads him to 
                                                 
61Jacobson and David Lyons defend a version of indirect utilitarianism called “sanction 
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63 See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981), 
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incorrect interpretations of Mill’s motivations in writing Utilitarianism. Second, 
Jacobson further argues that Mill believed that both hedonists (of several varieties) and 
indirect utilitarians are considered by Mill to be utilitarians in the context of Mill’s use 
of the term in Utilitarianism. 
Jacobson’s argument will be broken down here into four components relevant to 
this discussion. This exercise will not aim to present Jacobson’s arguments in their 
entirety, and a number of the philosophical nuances will be omitted for the sake of 
brevity and a concern for the question of discerning Mill’s intentions in writing 
Utilitarianism. That being said, this study will present all of the relevant evidence 
Jacobson cites so as to provide the best possible context for this study’s own 
contribution to these questions in the second and third chapters of this thesis.    
The first component in Jacobson’s argument is the claim that Mill held to an 
idiosyncratic version of utilitarianism. The first piece of evidence relevant to this claim 
is a letter sent to his conservative friend Thomas Carlyle in 1834 wherein Mill promises 
to provide “a more complete unfolding to you of my opinions and ways of thinking than 
I have ever yet made.”64 He writes: 
I am still, & am likely to remain, a utilitarian; though not one of “the people 
called utilitarians”; indeed, having scarcely one of my secondary premises in 
common with them; nor a utilitarian at all, unless in quite another sense from 
what perhaps any one except myself understands by the word.65  
 
                                                 
64 Mill to Thomas Carlyle, 12 January 1834, CW, XII, 207. 
65 Ibid., 207. 
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Mill makes this claim shortly after explaining how he was still holding true to the 
doctrine after his mental crisis66—a period where he was especially open to alternative 
views like Romanticism. Thus, the claim here is an affirmation of his continued support 
of the doctrine while also trying to separate himself from other utilitarians. It is worth 
recalling, as well, that Mill published criticisms of Bentham in 1833 and 1838, while 
also defending the utilitarian doctrine and Bentham against intuitionist criticisms in 
“Sedgwick’s Discourse” in 1838. Thus, Mill is in a position at this point to criticize 
utilitarianism as defended by Bentham, while still affirming his commitment to the 
doctrine generally.  
Of course, while he is embracing heterodoxy here it remains possible that Mill 
was more orthodox by the time he wrote Utilitarianism. Jacobson writes that believing 
this would be a mistake and one can see why by looking at two aspects of his moral 
theory that differentiate him from Bentham and several other utilitarians. First, consider 
Mill’s views on the relevance of motives in determining the rightness or wrongness of an 
action. In chapter two of Utilitarianism Mill writes, “there is no point which utilitarian 
thinkers and Bentham pre-eminently have taken more pains to illustrate than this that 
“the motive has nothing do with the morality of an action, though much with the worth 
of the agent.”67 While this echoes much of what Mill seems to believe, in two other 
places he adopts a more unorthodox view. In “Remarks on Bentham” he says "the great 
fault I have to find with Mr. Bentham as a moral philosopher … is this: that he has 
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67 Mill, U, 2.19. 
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practically, to a very great extent, confounded the principle of Utility with the principle 
of specific consequences of action, by ignoring the role of character in action.”68 
Similarly, in On Liberty, he writes at length on the moral importance of self-
development stating that, “It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also 
what manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man, which human life is 
rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man 
himself.”69 As Jacobson rightly notes, the fact that Mill’s comments in Utilitarianism 
sound more orthodox than his comments elsewhere coheres with the revisionist view, 
since that is precisely what his interpretation would predict.    
The second piece of evidence of Mill’s unorthodoxy concerns his comments on 
supererogation and moral action. A supererogatory act is an action that exceeds what is 
required by morality. Earlier utilitarians, such as William Godwin, accepted a direct 
version of utilitarianism that claimed that supererogation was impossible since one is 
required to do everything in one’s power to benefit the common good.70 Mill, though, 
defended the doctrine of supererogation throughout his career. The clearest presentation 
of this can be found in in an essay published in 1868 where he compares the mistakes of 
the theories of Auguste Comte with that of Calvinism, a view that does not countenance 
the possibility of supererogation: 
It does not perceive that between the region of duty and that of sin there is an 
intermediate space, the region of positive worthiness. It is not good that a person 
should be bound, by other people’s opinion, to do everything that they would  
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69 Mill, OL, 3.4.  
70 See William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (Hammondsworth, England: 
Penguin Classics, 1985), 174. 
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deserve praise for doing. There is a standard of altruism to which all should be 
required to come up, and a degree beyond it which is not obligatory, but 
meritorious.71 
 
This comment, too, is not anomalous in Mill’s writings but is echoed in passages in On 
Liberty and in his correspondence.72 Mill’s lack of discussion of supererogatory action in 
Utilitarianism supports the revisionist thesis because it provides an example of a 
controversial doctrine (within the utilitarian standpoint) that Mill seems to have held but 
not mentioned in the document. If Mill were giving his definitive statement of his views 
in Utilitarianism, it looks odd that he would omit discussion of this important topic. 
 The second component of Jacobson’s argument is that Mill presents an especially 
capacious notion of utilitarianism in Utilitarianism, which is appropriate since he is 
offering an ecumenical account. In Jacobson’s view, when Mill puts forward an original 
claim concerning the theory of utilitarianism in Utilitarianism, he explicitly marks it out 
as such. For instance, in his account of higher pleasures in chapter two and his claims 
about how to recognize those pleasures, Mill explicitly notes that he is moving outside 
the orthodoxy. It is important to recall that the discussion of higher pleasures occurs in 
response to the objection that utilitarianism is a doctrine worthy of swine. Mill remarks 
that utilitarians have generally been successful in refuting this charge by emphasizing 
the pleasures of the intellect though, “they might have taken the other, and, as it may be 
called, higher ground, with entire consistency.”73 The other, higher ground, of course, is 
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Mill’s own account of higher and lower pleasures, thus definitively differentiating his 
account from other utilitarians.  
 In another example of Mill’s capacious understanding of utilitarianism, Jacobson 
comments on Mill’s discussion of hedonism in Utilitarianism. At the outset of the 
second chapter Mill says that:  
every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility, 
meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure 
itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing the useful to 
the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that the useful means 
these, among other things. 
 
If one takes Mill seriously here, it sounds as if he thinks that hedonism stands as “the 
theory of utility itself,” a claim, as was discussed earlier, that is too strong when we 
consider what hedonism means. Indeed, Mill seems to back off from this strong 
statement shortly after this claim later in the chapter and seems to have a different notion 
entirely in his discussion of the principle of utility in chapter four.74  
Mill’s comments can be made sensible, though, when one considers his letter to 
the eminent classicist George Grote who questioned Mill’s claim in a passage from 
chapter one in Utilitarianism. Mill had written there that Socrates defended the theory of 
utilitarianism in the Platonic dialogue Protagoras. Grote’s objection was that Socrates, 
there, defends egoistic hedonism, a doctrine which, as we said earlier, is not consistent 
with utilitarianism. Nonetheless, Mill writes to Grote that, “As you truly say, The 
Protagorean Socrates lays down as the standard, the happiness of the agent himself, but 
his standard is composed of pleasure and pain, which ranges him, upon the whole, on the 
                                                 
74 See Mill’s distinction between happiness and pleasure in 2.2 and 2.12 and his discussion of the 
parts of happiness and desirability in chapter four.  
 40 
utilitarian side of the question.”75 In interpreting what Mill means here by including the 
Protagorean Socrates in the utilitarian camp (even when he clearly cannot be) Jacobson 
reminds the reader of Mill’s real foe in Utilitarianism: the intuitionist a priori moral 
philosophers. As has been discussed even by Crisp, Mill identifies the a priori and moral 
intuitionist philosophers as his chief philosophical opponents. When compared to them, 
even the hedonistic egoist accepts an inductive approach to ethics, which seems to be 
enough for Mill to count the hedonistic egoist as being “upon the whole” on the side of 
the utilitarians.        
The third component of Jacobson’s argument concerns Mill’s claims about the 
greatest happiness principle in chapter two. Interestingly, just before Mill introduces the 
greatest happiness principle he remarks in a footnote concerning the origin of the term 
utilitarianism, which should stand “as a name for one single opinion, not a set of 
opinions—to denote the recognition of utility as a standard, not any particular way of 
applying it.”76 In the eyes of some this might be taken to imply that Mill overtly 
announces his ecumenical intentions for the work. That said, Crisp might respond that 
Mill might only mean that utilitarians might have different secondary principles about 
how to apply the standard of utility.  
To see what Mill might mean in his claims about the greatest happiness principle, 
it is helpful to restate Mill’s claims in one of his most famous passages:   
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By 
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happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, 
and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up 
by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it 
includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open 
question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on 
which this theory of morality is grounded- namely, that pleasure, and freedom 
from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things 
(which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable 
either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of 
pleasure and the prevention of pain.77 
 
Earlier it was noted that Crisp’s interpretation of this passage argues for a kind of direct 
utilitarianism. However, given that Mill said that the greatest happiness principle was 
something that was supposed to be common to all utilitarians and not stand for a single 
way of interpretation, if it can be shown that Mill knew of other indirect utilitarians, then 
the greatest happiness principle must be interpreted in order to include them in theory. 
This is just what one finds when one examines Mill’s comments on William Paley in a 
discussion of Bentham: 
The recognition of happiness as the only thing desirable in itself, and of the 
production of the state of things most favorable to happiness as the only rational 
end both of morals and policy, by no means necessarily leads to the doctrine of 
expediency as professed by Paley: [that is,] the ethical canon which judges of the 
morality of an act or a class of actions, solely by the probable consequences of 
that particular kind of act, supposing it to be generally practiced. This is a very 
small part of what a more enlarged understanding of the “greatest-happiness 
principle” would require us to take into account.78 
 
This passage serves to demonstrate that Mill understood Paley to be an indirect 
utilitarian as the morality of an action is determined by evaluating actions of a class of 
actions of which it is a part, rather than the direct effect on the general happiness. As a 
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result, even in the passage stating the greatest happiness principle, it is not safe to 
assume that Mill is giving his personal view on utilitarianism.79    
 The fourth and final component of Jacobson’s argument concerns some of the 
extra-textual historical factors relevant to interpreting Utilitarianism. First, Jacobson 
considers the objection that if what he says is correct, it would imply that Utilitarianism 
is far less important than it has often been made out to be. Jacobson embraces this 
criticism, noting that it is the work’s pedagogical virtues, rather than its philosophical 
depth, that have made it as popular as it has been: “This little work fits nicely into an 
Introduction to Moral Philosophy course, being much more palatable to undergraduates 
than Sidgwick’s dense Methods of Ethics or Bentham’s torturous An Introduction to the 
Principles of Legislation.”80  
In fact, there is good reason to think that Mill himself did not consider it an 
especially important work in his corpus. One can get an impression of Mill’s thoughts on 
the document judging from its pedigree. Fraser’s magazine was a more popular venue 
than where Mill often published his work, a fact that seems at odds with Crisp’s view 
that it was not intended for a popular audience. In 1862, a year after Utilitarianism was 
published, Mill wrote to John Eliot Cairnes, “The wretched thing in Fraser which you so 
justly characterize, with others as bad as itself by which it has been followed, have quite 
disgusted me with the present conduct of the Magazine."81 At the same time, it is not  
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entirely surprising that Mill published there since he did so “when he wished to reach a 
broad audience, especially in order to enter into an ongoing popular dispute such as the 
debate over ‘Benthamism’ and its radical political reforms.”82 Mill did not expect many 
of his more educated friends, such as Samuel Bailey (whom Mill admired for his work 
on moral sentiments) to be familiar with the magazine.  
Finally, Jacobson notes that Mill did not expect Utilitarianism to be among his 
greatest works (he expected On Liberty and his System of Logic to have the longest 
survival), mentioning it only in passing in the course of his Autobiography and referring 
to it as his “little work.” Even here it seems unlikely that he was downgrading the work 
after the fact given that in 1862 he explained to Grote in a letter that: 
I am not more sanguine than you are about their converting opponents . . . The 
most that writing of that sort can be expected to do, is to place the doctrine in a 
better light, and prevent the other side having everything their own way, and 
triumphing in their moral and metaphysical superiority as they have done for the 
last half century. . . .83 
 
Jacobson notes further that Mill’s inactivity concerning the document seems rather 
strange if Utilitarianism was supposed to stand as one of his great works. In 1868 
Theodore Gomperz, working on a German translation of Utilitarianism, wrote to Mill 
saying that he saw a fallacy in one of Mill’s arguments in chapter four. Mill responded 
by noting that he had not had time to go back and explain and develop this passage 
further to show it not to be fallacious, but that perhaps he should do so. 84 While Mill 
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lived for five more years and completed his autobiography and maintained his vast 
correspondence, Mill never returned to the book in order to revise the argument.   
 To conclude, this chapter has highlighted four aspects of Jacobson’s revisionist 
argument. First, Jacobson offers evidence that Mill held to an especially unorthodox 
version of utilitarianism that is not evident in the document Utilitarianism. Second, in 
that document Mill’s argument suggest that he was operating with an especially 
capacious understanding of the term ‘utilitarianism,’ which is consistent with the idea 
that he had an ecumenical purpose in publishing in Fraser’s. Third, Jacobson tries to 
show that the greatest happiness principle discussion in chapter two can be read in ways 
that are not restricted to direct utilitarian interpretations. This is evidenced by Mill’s 
discussion of Paley and the latter writer’s understanding of the greatest happiness 
principle. Fourthly, Jacobson presents evidence concerning Mill’s negative attitude 
toward the publisher of Utilitarianism as well as Mill’s less than exultant remarks 
concerning the book in his Autobiography. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEFENSE OF REVISIONISM 
 
The previous chapter presented an outline of the contents of Utilitarianism as 
well as the respective views on how to interpret Mill’s intentions for that book according 
to Roger Crisp and Daniel Jacobson. The arguments of this chapter will be broken into 
five sections (including this opening section), with each serving the general aim of 
supporting Jacobson’s revisionist reading of Utilitarianism. The second section is a 
discussion of the history of the theory of utilitarianism, and how Mill saw himself within 
that history. The third section presents the early biographical context for understanding 
Mill’s development as a utilitarian, and his early break from the views of his father. This 
section also discusses Mill’s development as a thinker more generally, and his 
experience with some of the other intellectual traditions of the day whose influences are 
evident in Utilitarianism.  The third section also discusses the specifics of Mills’ plans 
and execution of the ecumenical defense of utilitarianism postulated by the revisionist 
thesis. It provides documentary evidence of Mill’s plan, his recognition of the need for 
such a defense, evidence for the separate composition of what came to be the fifth 
chapter of Utilitarianism, and a broader context for Mill’s reasons for publishing in 
Fraser’s. The fourth section is a historiographical analysis of Mill’s biographers with 
respect to their thoughts on Utilitarianism. The fifth and final section of this chapter 
examines the early reception of Utilitarianism in order to highlight the similarities 
between the initial responses to the book and reactions common today. In each of these 
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sections there will be some mention of how the evidence relates to the revisionist and 
orthodox interpretations, though the full implications of the material in this chapter will 
be discussed in greater detail in the fourth chapter of this study.    
 
Mill and the History of Utilitarianism  
 The purpose of this section is provide some context on Mill’s place in the history 
of utilitarian moral theory, and especially some information relevant to determining 
Mill’s conceptions of where he stood in that history. The aim here is by no means to give 
a substantive history of the view from its origins in the seventeenth century up to its 
most contemporary defenders. Instead, the objective is to discuss the key points of origin 
from Mill’s perspective, even if that actually provides a rather narrow focus concerning 
these large historical questions. This narrow focus is appropriate, it is argued, because 
the question at hand is what Mill took himself to be doing qua defender of utilitarianism 
when he published the document in 1861. Both Crisp and Jacobson would agree with 
Terence Irwin’s statement that Utilitarianism “is the result of Mills’ reflexions on 
utilitarianism over the previous thirty years,” but they disagree over what this really 
amounts to.85 According to Crisp, all of Mill’s writings on moral philosophy (beginning 
with “Remarks on Bentham” and his review of Blakey” in 1833) lead up to his claims in 
Utilitarianism and served to defend his brand of utilitarianism, while, in Jacobson’s 
view, Mill’s aims in Utilitarianism are ecumenical and intended to stand as a defense for 
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several varieties of utilitarian views. As such, this examination will include those aspects 
of the history of utilitarianism that are relevant to sorting out this dispute. 
 In the opening paragraph of Utilitarianism Mill writes that the origins of 
utilitarianism go back at least to Plato when he remarks that Socrates defended the 
theory against the claims of the sophist Protagoras.86 As was apparent in the discussion 
of Jacobson’s arguments, this is an important comment in that it reveals how capacious 
Mill’s use of the term is in that document. That said, Mill’s view here is not one that is 
widely shared by historians of moral thought. A more widely respected view comes from 
the philosopher and historian J.B. Schneewind who traces the origins of utilitarianism to 
Gottfried Leibniz and Richard Cumberland.87 As Schneewind understands it, 
utilitarianism is committed to three key tenets that were not simultaneously held by any 
thinker in the classical or medieval world. First, one should maximize the good for all 
and not merely the agent undertaking the action. Second, “goodness” should be 
understood in terms of pleasure and “badness” should be understood as pain. Third, from 
the requirement that the good of all should be maximized, one can derive all other moral 
principles. As to how this combination of views came about, he writes that it, “is what 
you get when Christian love is combined with a strong rational decision procedure. 
Make the outcome into an instrument for political work and the result is Benthamism.”88  
 The relevance of all of this to Mill comes in Schneewind’s view that these three 
tenets came together as a way to combat and critique theological voluntarism. 
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Theological voluntarism is a view within the Christian tradition that explains the truth or 
goodness of any entity back to God’s willing of that thing into existence (either directly 
or indirectly). That something is good is just to say that God willed it so; and if 
something appears to be irrational or evil then this judgment must be either a mistake or 
simply a mystery that cannot be overcome by human faculties. This view was quite 
popular in the seventeenth century, being defended (albeit in different forms) by such 
diverse figures as René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Samuel 
Pufundorf.89 From the perspectives of figures like Leibniz and Cumberland, though, this 
stance promotes a misguided view concerning God’s nature. To portray God in this way, 
in Leibniz’s view, is to render God as a tyrannical, despotic, and haphazardly whimsical 
deity. Cumberland and Leibniz have different theories of the precise nature of God’s 
goodness and what the free expression of God’s nature ultimately means, but what 
matters here is their shared view that God, in creating the world and its laws, chose the 
best possible world (i.e., he maximizes the good) and that through rational investigation 
one can discern what God’s laws are.  
 While there is something to be said for Schneewind’s views on the origins of 
utilitarianism, the focus on rejecting theological voluntarism might not be the best way 
to situate Mill’s understanding of the history of the doctrine. The chief difficulty here is 
that theological voluntarism was accepted by some prominent early utilitarians like 
William Paley.90 Mill thinks that Paley used utilitarianism to justify religious orthodoxy 
rather than accepting some of the more radical proposals that would follow from a 
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rigorous application of the view. To be clear, Mill did not think that Paley and others 
were misguided in taking this attitude toward utilitarianism, though he did note that once 
these figures grasped some of the potentially radical applications of the principle of 
utility, they moved away from connecting utilitarianism to religious orthodoxy. “But a 
change ensued, and the utilitarian doctrine, which had been the favourite theory of the 
defenders of orthodoxy, began to be used by its assailants. In the hands of the French 
philosophers, and in those of Godwin and of Bentham . . . a moral philosophy founded 
on utility led to many conclusions very unacceptable to the orthodox.”91 As usual, Mill 
wants to pitch the battle in moral philosophy as breaking down along the familiar 
“inductive” versus a priori or intuitionist/moral sense approaches.92  
 Much of this, of course, fits within the narrative suggested by Crisp’s account of 
Mill’s self-avowed place within utilitarianism. Crisp rightly acknowledges Mill’s 
inclination to emphasize the inductive approach to ethics and to see himself as furthering 
and improving upon Bentham’s brand of direct utilitarianism. While there is much that is 
correct about this picture concerning Mill’s relationship to Bentham’s views, it is 
appropriate to raise two complications that weaken Crisp’s reading and lend some 
support to Jacobson. Both concern Mill’s relationship to Bentham and the plausibility of 
Jacobson’s claim that Mill is offering an ecumenical defense of the utilitarian doctrine.   
 The first complication concerns the specific ways in which Mill went about 
criticizing and developing Bentham’s views. Both of Mill’s early essays critical of 
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Bentham were published anonymously, and Mill’s “Remarks on Bentham’s 
Philosophy,” where he was most critical, was not reprinted during his lifetime. Even in 
this period of the 1830’s after the death of James Mill, when Mill was especially critical 
of his intellectual heritage (having come under the influence of the radical St. Simonians 
as well the conservatives like Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Thomas Carlyle), Mill still 
did not wish to have this essay acknowledged as his (except to his close friends). To 
Carlyle he wrote, “I wish you could see something I have written lately about Bentham 
and Benthamism—but you can’t.”93 Similarly, to J.P. Nichol he wrote of this piece that 
it “Is not, and must not be, known to be mine.”94 Admittedly, Mill may have simply been 
fearful of his father’s negative gaze on these pieces, since he did not die until 1836, 
though it is notable nonetheless. In his Autobiography, Mill writes that though he stands 
by the criticisms he made in these essays, he sometimes “doubted whether it was right to 
publish it at that time. I have often felt that Bentham’s philosophy, as an instrument of 
progress, has been to some extent discredited before it had done its work, and that to 
lend a hand toward lowering its reputation was doing more harm than service to 
improvement.”95 Note also that in the earlier essays on moral philosophy that were not 
especially aimed at Bentham (e.g., “Blakey,” “Sedgewick,” and “Whewell”) Mill is 
defending Bentham against common misunderstandings of his views—a practice he 
continues in Utilitarianism. 
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 A second complication in Crisp’s narrative concerns the portrayal of Mill as 
developing his own theory in sharp distinction from Bentham in the course of 
Utilitarianism—especially in chapter two. The suggestion here, following an account by 
Frederick Rosen, is that Mill may not have been departing quite as sharply from 
Bentham as he is often taken to be.96 Rosen is not alone in this view, as the philosopher 
Geoffrey Scarre expressed the same sentiment when he wrote that: 
‘Utilitarianism’ is a highly puzzling work. Many of its ideas and argument could 
have flowed from the pen of Bentham himself. . . . These formulations resemble 
closely the summaries of Bentham’s position in the essays of the 1830s; the 
difference is that Mill  now appears to accept them!97 
 
 In a similar spirit, the argument below is that in many of Mill’s comments on his theory 
of higher and lower pleasures, he is saying a great deal with which Bentham would have 
agreed. Whereas many cite Bentham as Mill’s opponent in his discussion of higher and 
lower pleasures, it is argued in this study that evidence suggests that it is Thomas Carlyle 
who is the target of Mill’s comments in these sections.     
 One of the more commonly cited instances where Mill is taken to be developing 
his own theory concerns Mill’s account of pleasure in the second chapter of 
Utilitarianism. For instance, Wendy Donner has written, concerning this passage, that 
“Mill rejected much of Bentham’s thought and radically reinterpreted utilitarianism, 
expanding and enriching the conception of good at its core.”98 As has already been 
noted, Mill wrote the essays most critical of Bentham in the 1830s, which were a time 
when Mill was especially close to Carlyle who was a prominent critic of utilitarianism. 
                                                 
96 The analysis of this complication follows Rosen, Classical Utilitarianism, 166-184. 
97 Geoffrey Scarre, Utilitarianism, (London: Routledge, 1996), 91. 
98 Wendy Donner, The Liberal Self: John Start Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 8. 
 52 
Shortly after this time, though, we find Mill distancing himself from his conservative 
friend. Michael St. John Packe, in his biography of Mill, records the following anecdote 
concerning Mill’s reaction to his friend’s lectures on “Hero Worship” in 1840: 
Mill himself was absent. He and Harriet Taylor had attended the earlier 
performances, but at the second, the ‘Hero as Prophet’, he had disgraced himself. 
For when the orator launched into his favourite denunciation of the “Benthamee 
Utility, virtue by Profit and Loss’, and had reached the rhetorical passage ‘if you 
ask me which gives, Mahomet or they, the beggarlier and the falser view of Man 
and his Destinies’, Mill had risen to his feet, pale but unable to contain himself, 
and called out a decided ‘No!’ After which Harriet Taylor seems to have given 
away their tickets.99 
 
Following this incident, Carlyle offered a qualified apology to Mill in a later lecture, but 
remained nonetheless a firm critic of utilitarianism to the end of his days—especially in 
the theories of political economy advocated by Bentham and James Mill. Carlyle’s 
antagonism was directed at the doctrine’s tendency to weigh pleasures and pains when 
considering the best action, whereas Carlyle thought that one should “love not Pleasure, 
love God.”100 On his view, one ought to renounce the search for happiness completely 
since one had no right to happiness, and it served no part of the moral life. Interestingly, 
it is probably through Carlyle’s influence on Dickens, to whom Hard Times is dedicated, 
that we find the ridiculous character of Gradgrind who is supposed to stand as a kind of 
comedic indictment of the utilitarian doctrine.101  
 Mill thus had a varied relationship with Carlyle, and his Autobiography claimed 
that though he was never converted to any of Carlyle’s opinions, he found him very 
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useful in elucidating his own ideas.102 Even in the letter to Carlyle in 1834 (discussed in 
the previous chapter) where Mill said that he was a utilitarian but not “one of the people 
called utilitarians,” Mill affirms many doctrines to be found later in utilitarianism, 
including the importance of self-development as conceived in the utilitarian tradition of 
doing so for the benefit of mankind. Similar notions are echoed in Mill’s diary entry in 
1854 (as he was beginning to write Utilitarianism) when he is writing on Carlyle’s 
notions of hero worship. There he writes: 
Moral regenerators in this age mostly aim at setting up a new form either of 
Stoicism or of Puritanism—persuading men to sink altogether earthly happiness 
as a pursuit. . . . What is now wanted is the creed of Epicurus warmed by the 
additional element of an enthusiastic love of the general good.103 
 
 This “creed of Epicurus” and its connection to utilitarianism was recognized by 
many earlier utilitarians like David Hume, Adam Smith, Paley, Bentham, and obviously 
continues in Mill. As we have seen, Mill echoes this connection to Epicurus often in 
Utilitarianism, mentioning it six times in the opening paragraphs of the document. Mill’s 
point in tying himself to this tradition was ostensibly to emphasize the point that utility is 
connected to the concept of pleasure and pain, and that the Epicureans should not be 
represented, as they sometimes were, as defending a “beastly” view of life. Instead, Mill 
asserts in Utilitarianism, all writers advocating “Epicurean theories of life” affirm the 
importance of the intellect and the cultivation of wisdom. This is because, according to 
the tradition, the wise person kept desires within bounds so as to avoid the pains of 
disappointment. Also, the wise person was not afraid of death or the future generally, as 
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she knew that a life guided by reason and wisdom afforded protections from the 
obstacles of bad fortune.104 
 While there appears to be no reason to think that in writing this Mill is excluding 
Bentham from among those espousing the importance of the intellect, Mill’s claim 
shortly after making this connection to Utilitarianism is interesting: 
It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the 
superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, 
safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former—that is, in their circumstantial 
advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points utilitarians 
have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may 
be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the 
principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more 
desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in 
estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the 
estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.105 
  
 
Note that while Mill does not define to whom he refers as “utilitarian writers,” it is often 
thought that he was referring to Bentham and his account of pains and pleasures in An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.106 One might wonder, though, 
if this was Mill’s target why he indicates a plurality of utilitarians rather than giving 
Bentham by name or leaving the term singular. Admittedly, he may just be referring to 
followers of Bentham, but it is puzzling nonetheless. The puzzle gets deeper, though, 
when one looks closer at the narrative that is typically given in explaining how Mill’s 
theory of pleasure differs from Bentham.  
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Critics often point to Mill’s complaint of Bentham’s view that “pushpin is as 
good as poetry.” Mill’s criticism, though, has a kind of strange history of its own as it 
has led to much scholarly confusion. For one, this criticism occurs in “Bentham” in 1838 
rather than in Utilitarianism itself. There, Mill writes that “[Bentham] says, somewhere 
in his works, that ‘quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry.’”107 
Scholars have traced this quote to Bentham’s The Rationale of Reward published in 
1825, which was published shortly before Mill’s intellectual crisis.  
Rosen makes two very interesting points, though, with respect to this passage in 
Bentham. First, Mill misquotes Bentham here as the original passage says nothing about 
‘quantity of pleasure,’ “and had Mill quoted the passage as it is in published text, it 
might never have been noticed by later scholars as being of any relevance to the 
distinction between quality and quantity of pleasure as it appears in Utilitarianism.”108  
Note that in the essay on Bentham, Mill himself does not draw any such connection, and 
it is possible to doubt that he saw one at all. Second, Bentham’s comment on this matter 
relates to a specific policy question concerning state support of the fine arts. In this 
context, he writes: 
Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences 
of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnishes more pleasure, it is more 
valuable than either. Everybody can play at push-pin: poetry and music are 
relished only by a few.109 
 
In his comment on “prejudice apart” Bentham was accounting for individual taste, not 
his personal view, as he certainly preferred music to push-pin. The point Bentham is 
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making in this context, though, is that when the state is considering which acts it should 
sponsor (when considering how to increase general utility) it should choose to sponsor 
those activities that are enjoyed by many and not the few. In other words, Bentham is not 
making a metaphysical point here about the nature of pains and pleasures, but rather a 
policy recommendation. On Rosen’s view, Mill’s misquotation is not intended as a 
misrepresentation of Bentham, but “was only calling attention to the fact that greater 
numbers of people enjoyed push-pin as opposed to poetry. Nevertheless, he 
unintentionally misled later scholars on the trail of the distinction between quantity and 
quality of pleasures and pains.”110 In order to further underline this point, Rosen goes on 
to give an argument suggesting that the typical understanding of Bentham not 
recognizing a distinction between quantity and quality of pleasures is mistaken.111 In 
fact, Bentham, too, recognized important distinctions between various kinds of 
pleasures, and did not have a reductionist and purely quantitative understanding of the 
concept. Thus, in the quote from chapter two when Mill writes that “some kinds of 
pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others,” Bentham would have agreed 
with Mill, thus taking much of the wind out of the sails of those who see a sharp break 
with Mill and Bentham in this passage.  
 To further explore the view that it is Carlyle and not Bentham to whom Mill is  
responding, one can consider Rosen’s suggestion that Mill was attempting to connect the 
Stoics to the Epicurean tradition. Earlier it was noted that the Epicurean tradition favored 
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the wise man’s life over the fool’s, since the fool’s pleasures would be inconstant and 
confined to the senses. That said, when Mill writes that it is better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied, it is significant that Bentham would not agree to this in 
the strictest sense. Bentham would agree that it is often necessary to sacrifice short-term 
pleasure for long-term ones (in economic matters this is often required), but it is not 
better per se, to be Socrates dissatisfied. Mill’s minor departure, though, makes sense if 
we put his comments in the larger context of Mill’s earlier writings and Bentham’s 
comments on asceticism. In the second chapter of An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation, Bentham distinguishes two historical groups, the philosophical 
and religious ascetics, who rejected pleasure in the pursuit of pain.112 The philosophical 
ascetics, comprised of the Stoics or modern philosophers influenced by Stoicism, 
rejected physical pleasures for the sake of honor, reputation, or philosophical pride. In 
this way, Bentham notes, they were indirectly committed to pursuing pleasure (even if 
they did not acknowledge it as such), but they typically took things too far and their 
doctrines served as a “misapplication” of the principle of utility. They did not actively 
pursue pain as such, but saw it as a way by which their minds might be cleansed from a 
focus on unimportant things. The philosophical ascetics, though, were not nearly as 
threatening as the religious ascetics, a group about whom Bentham was especially 
concerned. This group, Bentham writes, celebrated pain and its infliction upon others 
and was motived by fear at the prospect of future pains “at the hands of a splenetic and 
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revengeful Deity.”113 Regardless of their disparate motivations these two ascetic groups 
explicitly opposed the principle of utility and the doctrines of Epicurus, despite the fact 
that they did not really understand these views.  
 With this context in mind, it is worth considering Mill’s comments on his essay 
“Whewell on Moral Philosophy,” written just two years before he began composing 
Utilitarianism:   
The Stoics did not go so far as the ascetics; they stopped half-way. They did not 
say that pain is a good, and pleasure an evil. But they said, and boasted of saying, 
that pain is no evil, and pleasure no good: and this is all, and more than all, that 
Bentham imputes to them, as may be seen by any one who reads that chapter of 
his book. This, however, was enough to place them, equally with the ascetics, in 
direct opposition to Bentham, since they denied his supreme end to be an end at 
all. And hence he classed them and the ascetics together, as professing the direct 
negation of the utilitarian standard.114 
 
This passage indicates that Mill understood Bentham’s differences from the Stoics, and 
found much common ground with Bentham in denouncing certain types of asceticism as 
the case of the Puritans. In On Liberty, Mill denounced the “fanatical moral intolerance” 
of the Puritan tradition that had been so successful in demonizing amusements like 
music, theatre, and other public events, and in an 1867 address Mill similarly pilloried 
“Puritanism, which looking upon every feeling of human nature, except fear and 
reverence for God, as a snare, if not as partaking of sin, looked coldly, if not 
disapprovingly, on the cultivation of the sentiments.”115 In other writings, though, Mill 
pointed to various shared views between the Epicurean and Stoic traditions.116 Both 
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groups also held up Socrates as an ideal kind of wise man, a fact commented upon by 
Mill’s friend and classicist George Grote who wrote that the two groups actually shared 
a number of agreements in their practice even if they differed in their theoretical 
groundings.117   
Grote’s comment is not an isolated one in the period as, according to the scholar 
Reid Barbour, there was a kind of cultural obsession within England to reconcile the 
Epicurean and Stoic traditions, and, curiously enough, this is actually well reflected in 
the text of chapter two of Utilitarianism itself.118 As Rosen puts it, “Mill’s agenda in this 
part of Utilitarianism was to prise elements of Stoicism away from Puritanism and link 
them to the Epicurean tradition,” and all of this was done so as to oppose the kinds of 
ideas Carlyle defended.119  
Carlyle argued that humans should be content to do without happiness.120 In 
Mill’s eyes, Carlyle’s views advocated a new and dangerous kind of Puritanism that 
should be repressed. In Mill’s view, one should take the Stoic insight of championing 
individual liberty with dignity and combine it with the Epicurean emphasis on 
intellectual pleasures as the highest sources of value. Admittedly, some intellectual 
pleasures might open one up to certain kinds of sufferings, but such things appeared to 
him to be an unavoidable concomitant of intellectual growth. At the same time, 
cultivating the intellectual pleasures and the Stoic virtues allows one to embrace 
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sacrifice without giving up on the pursuit of happiness. This offers a new model for what 
a utilitarian might look like: 
I will add, that in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, 
the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realising, 
such happiness as is attainable. For nothing except that consciousness can raise a 
person above the chances of life, by making him feel that, let fate and fortune do 
their worst, they have not power to subdue him: which, once felt, frees him from 
excess of anxiety concerning the evils of life, and enables him, like many a Stoic 
in the worst times of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquility the sources of 
satisfaction accessible to him, without concerning himself about the uncertainty 
of their duration, any more than about their inevitable end.121 
 
He notes, though, in the previous paragraph that this sacrifice is not good in itself, but it 
is still only valuable insofar as it benefits his fellow man. To do otherwise, he writes, “is 
no more deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar.”122  
 At this point it is worth summarizing and restating what this second complication 
of Crisp’s narrative ultimately means. It was noted earlier that in Crisp’s view Mill’s 
discussion of higher and lower pleasures is taken to be directed at Bentham.  Here, 
following Frederick Rosen, it has been suggested that Mill scholars have actually been 
led astray by Mill’s characterization of Bentham’s comments on push-pin and poetry, 
and there is a suggestion that Bentham would actually find little to disagree with in 
Mill’s account of higher pleasures. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that Mill’s 
target in these places is actually Thomas Carlyle, a figure who was attempting, in Mill’s 
view, to impose a kind of renewed Puritanism in Victorian society. To combat this 
movement, Mill might be seen as altering the utilitarian tradition to some extent by 
combining elements of Stoicism with Epicureanism—a move made less radical by the 
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fact that Epicureanism was already firmly within the utilitarian tradition. This 
incorporation explains some of Mill’s passages in chapter two when he speaks of 
embracing sacrifice for the sake of humanity. All of this is important since it re-shapes 
the narrative that Crisp would like to push. Rather than sharply breaking with Bentham, 
Mill is, in a subtle way, shifting the tradition so as to be more inclusive and to combat 
hardened enemies of the movement like Thomas Carlyle. 
  
Early Biographical Context for “Utilitarianism” 
 This section will focus on giving the early biographical context in considering 
Mill’s intentions concerning the document Utilitarianism. While Chapter I included 
some points on Mill’s life in the course of discussing Crisp’s narrative of Mill’s writings, 
it is worth revisiting some of those points and adding others so as to create the proper 
context for understanding Mill when he wrote Utilitarianism. The discussion here will 
begin with a discussion of the events leading up to Mill’s mental crisis, and continue to 
the more immediate context surrounding Mill’s plans for an ecumenical defense of the 
utilitarian view.  
It is important to be clear how this current analysis will stand in support of the 
revisionist position. The following description will be an outline of the narrative that will 
be presented in this section. Before his mental crisis, Mill was firmly within the 
Benthamite tradition and had been long in training to be a philosophical and political 
radical. Following that crisis, Mill expanded his intellectual horizons by reading widely 
among the Romantic philosophers and writers, even though these figures approached the 
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world in a much different way than the young Mill was used to. While Mill was 
influenced by these thinkers, he remained a utilitarian, and became famous as a logician 
and political economist. Along the way, Mill met and fell in love with Harriet, whom he 
married. She influenced his thought a great deal—especially in drawing Mill further 
away from the conservative approaches of the Romantics. Just as he achieved fame and 
married his beloved, however, Mill’s deteriorating health led to worries that he might 
die. This led him to look upon his life with a newfound purpose and a desire to take on 
some of the most significant projects of his life.   
All of this is relevant since, as the previous section indicated, it is important  for 
the revisionist position to establish Mill’s familiarity with the arguments of 
conservatives like Carlyle, and this section will demonstrate both Mill’s reasons for 
doing this and the extent of his familiarity. Also, it is important to situate Mill as 
someone positioned to develop and defend utilitarian moral theory. The orthodox 
position views Mill less as a defender, though, and more as a kind of utilitarian apostate: 
moving in an almost straight line from his initial break with Bentham in his mental crisis 
to criticizing Bentham in print with his articles in the 1830s to breaking finally with the 
orthodox Benthamite view in Utilitarianism. On the revisionist narrative, though, the 
story is more complicated. Rather than an apostate, Mill is more akin to the wayward son 
who leaves home (without going too far) to venture into the wider world, attains some 
wisdom and fame, and then returns to his father’s house with newfound tools and 
initiative to repair the home.   
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 At the beginning of this analytical narrative, though, Mill was still firmly in the 
house of Bentham. By 1821, following the most intense part of his father’s educational 
plan, the young John Stuart was attempting to decide upon a career. Initially, Mill was 
inclined toward studying the law, as his father had a friend in John Austin, a barrister 
and later professor of jurisprudence at London University. Austin achieved fame later in 
life by publishing The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, a work inspired by 
Bentham’s views that argued that the law should be considered from a purely scientific 
viewpoint rather than as a source or instrument of moral values.123 Given his sympathy 
with Bentham’s ideas, James Mill allowed his son to study Roman and English law with 
Austin. While Austin was an important influence for Mill’s early thinking and greatly 
aided his understanding of history of government and notions of justice (evident in the 
opening chapters in On Liberty and the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism), Mill dropped his 
tutor and took up a career in the East India Company in India house in 1823, a position 
he held until 1858, when he retired with a generous pension.124  
In many ways, working at India House was a great boon to Mill. It provided him 
with a stable income, an inside look at how political questions were decided within the 
bureaucracy of his time, and ample free time to pursue his journalistic and philosophical 
interests. Mill enjoyed a fairly leisurely existence at India House. He arrived at his office 
at about ten in the morning, ate breakfast while reading dispatches, and worked only till 
one in the afternoon, at the latest. Until he left the office at six, most of the rest of the 
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day was spent receiving visitors, attending to his correspondence, or working on his own 
writings. In terms of providing a steady income and the leisure to read, write, think, and 
converse with friends and writers who knew where to find him, Mill could hardly have 
done better in his career choice.125 
It was also in the years between 1821 and 1826 that Mill most closely identified 
himself with Bentham’s philosophy. As was discussed in the previous chapter when 
noting Crisp’s narrative of the young Mill’s development, Mill’s study of Bentham’s 
philosophy in 1821 proved to be a kind of synthesizing activity of his previous 
education. As Mill describes it in his Autobiography, reading Bentham at this time 
brought together all of his earlier education and put it into clear focus. Bentham himself 
was associated with a larger intellectual movement of the time called Philosophical 
Radicalism. The Radicals combined a number of philosophical, psychological, and 
economic theories into a (not always homogenous) political program, some (but not all) 
of which Mill maintained throughout his career. Generally speaking, the Radicals were 
committed to Thomas Hartley’s empiricist epistemology (the senses are primarily 
responsible for what we know), James Mill’s associationist theory of the mind (the mind 
follows quasi-mechanical laws that can be understood and manipulated just like physical 
laws), Bentham’s psychological hedonism (humans action follows a pattern of seeking 
pleasure and avoiding pain), David Ricardo’s theory of political economy (national 
economies grow better when there is little government interference), and Thomas 
Malthus’ theory that population growth, if unchecked, would eventually outrun a 
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nation’s food supply.126 In defending these views, Mill joined various debating 
organizations at an assortment of social gatherings (e.g., the Debating Clubs, the 
Utilitarian Society, the Political Economy Reading Group) and published defenses of 
Radical politics in intellectual journals like the Westminster Review.  In addition to these 
activities, at the age of only nineteen, he set out to edit Bentham’s massive Rationale for 
Judicial Evidence, a formidable intellectual task that occupied Mill for the next several 
years. Adding to this, Mill began taking German lessons from Austin’s wife.  As one 
biographer wrote of Mill’s many commitments at this point in his life: “The intellectual 
activities in this fantastic list were none of them of a transitory nature and all of them 
continued unabated into 1826. Retribution inevitably followed.”127  
 That retribution, according to the intellectual historian Stefan Collini, provided 
“one of the best-known identity-crises in history.”128 Mill describes the crisis famously 
in his Autobiography: 
. . . it occurred to me to put the question directly to myself, “Suppose that all your 
objects in life were realized; that all the changes in institutions and opinions 
which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very 
instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?” And an irrepressible 
self-consciousness distinctly answered, “No!” At this my heart sank within me: 
the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. . . . I seemed 
to have nothing left to live for.129 
 
Mill writes that he consulted his favorite books and yearned for someone to express his 
feelings to, but he found no one and no text or set of arguments that could set his mind at 
ease. He knew that his father would not be receptive to his worries; and he did not want 
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to upset the elder Mill with the idea that the educational experiment had failed. Though 
none of Mill’s acquaintances noticed a change in him, and he continued on in his normal 
duties, he seemed to have had a crisis that altered his relationship with his intellectual 
forbears in a significant way. 
In his Autobiography, Mill says that he came to two conclusions as a result of 
this crisis.130 The first was that the best means to happiness was through the indirect 
route whereby one ceases to aim at happiness for one’s life, and aims instead at some 
other object like the happiness of others or some other pursuit. On this point he says that 
he never abandoned the view that happiness was the true end in life and the test of all 
rules of conduct, but that, as was discussed in the previous section, there was some truth 
to the idea like Carlyle’s that one could gain something in ceasing to aim directly at 
happiness. The second conclusion, which had a special kind of importance in the next 
part of his life, was his identification of the need for developing one’s “internal culture” 
through embracing the arts and especially poetry. This led him to his first serious 
interaction with Romantic poetry and in particular with the poetry of Wordsworth who 
provided “the precise thing for my mental wants at this particular juncture.”131 While his 
father had taught him the importance of verse for its usefulness in persuading others, he 
now saw it as a way to connect with his emotions in a way that he never had before. This 
in turn led him to read more carefully other authors often associated more generally with 
the Romantic movement. These included figures like Samuel Taylor Coleridge, whose 
conservative political views stood in sharp contrast to those of the Philosophical 
                                                 
130 Ibid., 137-147. 
131 Ibid., 151. 
 67 
Radicals.132 During the late 1820s and the 1830s, Mill both read and regularly conversed 
with Romantic and conservative theorists like Coleridge and Carlyle; many of his 
writings from the 1830s (e.g., “Bentham,” “Remarks on Bentham,” and “Civilization”) 
reflect this and stand as indicators of his dissatisfaction with the Radicals. This accounts 
for his candid letter to Carlyle in 1832 where he described himself as not being one of 
“the people called utilitarians.” 
Following this period of mental stress Mill engaged in a number of larger 
intellectual projects that are worth noting, but whose specific contents are not especially 
germane to the purposes of this thesis. These included his editorship of the periodical the 
London and Westminster Review, and the publication of his System of Logic (1843) and 
the Principles of Political Economy (1848). The first of these was important for 
expanding Mill’s intellect and connections in the larger circles of Victorian intellectuals, 
while the latter two were important in establishing Mill as a pre-eminent mind within 
those circles. Arthur Balfour, the Conservative Prime Minister who had once studied 
with the utilitarian Henry Sidgwick, wrote that Mill’s authority in the universities as a 
result of his Logic was, “comparable to that wielded forty years earlier by Hegel in 
Germany and in the Middle Ages by Aristotle.”133 At his death in 1873, Mill was at 
work on the eighth edition, which, despite its length and difficulty was still selling well. 
Mill’s Principles was similarly successful and, according to his biographer Richard 
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Reeves, “established Mill as the highest-profile economist of the Victorian era.”134 The 
book was read widely in the universities and sold well: a People’s Edition of the book 
went through multiple editions and sold more than ten-thousand copies.135 In 1905, legal 
scholar A.V. Dicey gave a speech in which he said that, “At Oxford we swallowed Mill, 
rather undigested: he was our chief intellectual food until 1860.”136 While this might 
exaggerate the state of affairs somewhat, it is undeniable that Mill’s Logic and 
Principles established him as one of the outstanding intellects of his time, even before 
the publication of some of the works that are widely read today like On Liberty, 
Utilitarianism, and the Subjection of Women.       
 One notable difference, however, between Mill’s Principles and his Logic, is that 
while Harriet, by Mill’s own account, was not influential in shaping the latter, she had a 
great influence on the former—so much so that Mill wanted to dedicate the work to her, 
but eventually decided not to because of the objections of Harriet’s still-living husband, 
John Taylor. In the previous chapter there was a discussion of the importance of 
Harriet—a woman whom Mill held in the greatest regard both intellectually and morally. 
Mill first met Harriet in 1830, the two married in 1851, and she died in 1858. A great 
deal has been written trying to figure out precisely what kind of intellectual influence 
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she imparted to Mill’s works, though this tangled question will by no means be settled 
here.137 As Dale Miller aptly puts it:  
The available evidence underdetermines judgments about the value to John of his 
collaboration with Harriet. Very different hypotheses are consistent with the facts 
at hand, and just as the people who knew Harriet formed wildly divergent 
conclusions about her as a person, so too have different interpreters reached 
wildly different conclusions about the scope and significance of her influence on 
John and hence her philosophical contributions.138  
 
Mill himself speaks to the difficulties of sorting out the question in his Autobiography, 
which he and Harriet worked on extensively together: 
When two persons have their thoughts and speculations completely in common; 
when all subjects of intellectual or moral interest are discussed between them in 
daily life, and probed to much greater depths than are usually or conveniently 
sounded in writings intended for general readers; when they set out from the 
same principles, and arrive at their conclusions by processes pursued jointly, it is 
of little consequence in respect to the question of originality, which of them 
holds the pen; the one who contributes least to the composition may contribute 
most to the thought; the writings which result are the joint product of both, and it 
must often be impossible to disentangle their respective parts, and affirm that this 
belongs to one and that to the other.139 
 
For the purposes of this work, what is important is determining her possible 
influence on Utilitarianism, and to do that it seems appropriate to say something about 
her own view and her impact on other writings. Part of the controversy surrounding 
Harriet concerns the fact that she seems to have held much more left-of-center political 
views than Mill and seems to have been the inspiration for many of his more 
progressive attitudes toward women.  
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While it is difficult to say exactly how this altered Mill’s views, it is important to 
be clear that the position advanced here is not consistent with the view of the scholar 
Gertrude Himmelfarb. Himmelfarb stands at the extreme end of those who see Harriet 
as a simultaneously dominant and pernicious influence.  Himmelfarb has argued that, in 
Mill’s published works, one can find “Two Mills.”140 The first Mill is the Mill who 
famously defended the doctrines of On Liberty and his essays on the rights of women.  
Himmelfarb argues that this Mill wrote these works under the close supervision of his 
wife, and that Mill changed his views after her death as he was no longer under her 
influence.  As she sees it, when Mill wrote On Liberty and Utilitarianism he penned 
two fundamentally incommensurable projects, “The primary goods in Utilitarianism 
were morality and a sense of unity, the primary goods in On Liberty were liberty and 
individuality.”141  In her view, trying to interpret Mill as a consistent thinker in these 
two works is a fundamental mistake. Though many scholars acknowledge that there are 
difficulties in figuring out precisely how influential Taylor was to Mill, the mainstream 
view seems to be that she was an importantly influential voice in Mill’s thought but not 
nearly as dominant as Himmerlfarb suggests.  Furthermore, the philosopher C.L. Ten 
has responded to Himmelfarb’s arguments in detail and points out that one can see 
consistency in what Mill says in On Liberty with his later works like Utilitarianism, as 
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well as earlier works like his essay “On Civilization” when he was acting under more 
conservative influences.142         
For the purposes of this work, the relevant context for understanding Mill’s 
relationship to Harriet comes in 1853, after they had been married for a few years and 
were enjoying the intimate time together that they had been denied previously. 
Unfortunately, health concerns assumed a prominent place in the thinking of both 
Harriet and Mill, as one or the other was either ill or recovering from illness for the 
remainder of their marriage. In 1853 on a trip to Nice, Harriet was struck with a severe 
hemorrhage of the lung and nearly died. Following her recovery, Mill returned to 
London in January 1854 only to find himself suffering from tuberculosis, while Harriet 
stayed in France, as she was too ill to travel back to London (Mill, ironically, had run 
out of sick time). Mill’s health quickly deteriorated to the point that Mill wrote in his 
diary in April of that year that “I look upon it as a piece of excellent good fortune to 
have the whole summer before one to die in.”143 Though Mill, obviously, recovered 
from his illness his fear of Harriet’s or his own death galvanized him to record both of 
their thoughts as assiduously as he could. As one biographer puts it, “From this point 
on, even though he would in fact live another two decades, Mill felt himself to be in a 
race with death.”144 Despite all his achievements up to this point, Mill felt as if he had 
done little of worth up to this point and needed to do much more: 
                                                 
142 C.L. Ten, Mill On Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). He also argues that Himmelfarb’s 
interpretation rests on a dubious reading of Mill’s Liberty Principle.  For a summary of this debate see 
John Gray and G.W. Smith, eds., J.S. Mill On Liberty in Focus (New York: Routledge, 1991), 2-3. 
143 Mill, CW, XXVII, 665. 
144 Reeves, Firebrand, 246. 
 72 
When death draws near, how contemptibly little appears the good one has done! 
How gigantic that which one had the power and therefore the duty of doing! I 
seem to have frittered away the working years of life in mere preparatory trifles, 
and now “the night when no one can work” has surprised me with the real duty 
of my life undone.145 
 
Mill’s Plan of Defense    
At this point one finds Mill in an interesting place in his life. He was an 
accomplished scholar who is widely respected in at least two fields of intellectual 
inquiry (logic and political economy). At the same time, he was a self-professed 
utilitarian, a view widely discredited in the 1850s just at the time that he was coming to 
terms with his own mortality. After closely examining Romantic and conservative views, 
Mill was in a position to take on new projects that were to rejuvenate utilitarian theory, 
especially given the fact that he was taken seriously by the greatest minds of his day. In 
this section, the emphasis will be on taking this biographical context and adding 
evidence from Mill’s writings that provide reasons in support of the revisionist position. 
This involves situating Mill’s evident plans to write a general defense of the principle of 
utility, recognition of the need to write such an ecumenical defense, evidence of the 
separate composition of his essay on justice that became the fifth chapter in 
Utilitarianism, and a contextualization of Mill’s choice of publishing Utilitarianism in 
Fraser’s magazine.     
In this context it is worth recalling a discussion from the previous chapter 
concerning Mill’s planned writing projects in 1854, as he expressed them in a letter to 
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Harriet. Mill’s letter in February of 1854 says that he had finished one essay and was 
planning on commencing another but was unsure which he should start: 
I will just copy the list of subjects we made out in the confused order in which 
we put them down. Differences of character (nation, race, age, sex, 
temperament). Love. Education of tastes. Religion de l’Avenir. Plato. Slander. 
Foundation of morals. Utility of religion. Socialism. Liberty. Doctrine that 
causation is will. To these I have now added from your letter: Family, & 
Conventional.146 
 
When Harriet wrote back, she convinced him to write on the “Utility of 
Religion,” which he did. Interestingly, though, he continued to record occasional 
thoughts in his diary, some of which provide reason to think that Mill began to write 
Utilitarianism at this time. Mill recorded two diary entries in early 1854 that seem 
especially suggestive of him initiating the process of writing Utilitarianism. The first is 
not necessarily a direct reference to the document or its contents but perhaps 
foreshadows his interest in writing an ecumenical document like Utilitarianism: 
Those who are in advance of their time need to gain the ear of the public by 
productions of inferior merit—works grounded on the premises commonly 
received—in order that what they may be able to write of first-rate value to 
mankind may have a chance of surviving until there are people capable of 
reading it.147 
 
This kind of language here also coincides with Mill’s idea of his and Harriet’s writings 
serving as a kind of “mental pemmican” for future thinkers. The second reference in the 
diary is more directly applicable to Utilitarianism as it recalls the familiar language of 
the higher and lower pleasures discussion of chapter two. There Mill writes: 
The only true or definite rule of conduct or standard of morality is the greatest 
happiness, but there is needed first a philosophical estimate of happiness. Quality 
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as well as quantity of happiness is to be considered; less of a higher kind is 
preferable to more of a lower. The test of quality is the preference given by those 
who are acquainted with both. Socrates would rather choose to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than to be a pig satisfied. The pig probably would not, but then the 
pig knows only one side of the question: Socrates knows both.148 
 
There is also evidence that suggests that Mill had initiated his writing in 1854 in another 
letter to Harriet in late 1854. Here Mill referenced Carlyle’s discussion of Novalis and 
the suicide of the whole human race, which very closely resembles a comment made in 
the second chapter of Utilitarianism.149  
Finally, it is worth adding three more small but important pieces of evidence 
concerning Mill’s possible intentions for the document. All three of these pieces of 
evidence serve as evidence that Mill saw a need for an ecumenical defense of 
utilitarianism. The first comes in a letter he wrote to John Austin concerning the latter’s 
two upcoming book projects. The first was a continuation of Austin’s early work on 
jurisprudence that Mill believes would be rather easy for Austin since much of it had 
already been done. However, “the other which would be more important is a systematic 
treatise on morals. This last may wait long for any one with the intellect & the courage 
to do it as it should be done. And until it is done we cannot expect much improvement in 
the common standard of moral judgments & sentiments.150 Austin, though, did not take 
up this challenge and died before taking on the project. The second instance of Mill 
mentioning the need for a general defense of utility came, in August of 1858, before the 
publication of On Liberty, when Mill had written to his associate Theodore Gomperz 
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who was requesting that he be allowed to use some of Mill’s work in his writing. Mill 
encouraged him to go ahead and adds the thought that, “There are not many defences 
extant of the ethics of utility, and I have sometimes thought of reprinting this and other 
papers I have written on the same as well as on other subjects.”151 Mill’s language here 
is interesting as he does not say that what is needed is for him to give his own views on 
the topic of utility, but rather that what is needed is a defense of the ethics of utility as 
such—which is precisely what the revisionist argument entails. The third piece of 
evidence concerns Mill’s letter to Charles Dupont-White in October of 1861, which is 
the same time that the articles that came to be Utilitarianism were released in Fraser’s. 
In that letter Mill writes that he had recently published an exposition on the doctrine of 
utility, but wants to correct an impression he has gotten from his correspondent’s past 
letters: 
Like many French, you appear to be of the opinion that the idea of Utility is in 
England the dominant philosophy. It is nothing of the sort. I understand that one 
might see in that doctrine a certain analogy with the spirit of the English nation. 
But in fact it is, and it has almost always been, very unpopular there. Most 
English writers do not only deny it, they insult it: and the school of Bentham has 
always been regarded (I say it with regret) as an insignificant minority.152     
 
Again, this highlights Mill’s acknowledgement for the need to popularize utilitarianism 
even in his own country—something that an ecumenical defense might accomplish. 
Also, it is worth highlighting Mill’s use of the term “regret” concerning the minority 
status of “Bentham’s school.” If Utilitarianism is supposed to stand as Mill’s 
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fundamental break with Bentham, this kind of language appears very strange indeed, 
especially as it comes in 1861.       
 Mill appears to have worked on On Liberty throughout the mid-1850s, though he 
did not send it to his publisher until 1859. He did not publish it till then as he had 
suffered the tremendous personal setback of Harriet’s death in October 1858. At the 
midpoint of 1858 the two had seemed to be in good health. They often travelled to 
France together (Mill was a lifelong Francophile) and this time travelled to Dijon and 
Lyon. At Lyon, though, Harriet took ill with a fever and cough, and the two moved to 
their favorite hotel in Avignon hoping she could recover there. The doctors there, 
however, were powerless and she died in November 1858.  
After almost a month of grieving, Mill managed to contact his publisher J.W. 
Parker, saying that he had a new essay, On Liberty, ready for publication. By Mill’s own 
account, this document he and Harriet had collaborated on so assiduously had already 
been completed for eighteen months. As Mill’s biographer Packe puts it: 
It had been written and rewritten, every word had been discussed and weighed. It 
had been kept on hand, luxuriously awaiting any amendment that someday might 
seem desirable. Now Harriet was dead, that was no longer a possibility; both Mill 
and Helen affirm that in this book especially the ideas are mostly hers; and since 
her voice was silent, no one else would be allowed to alter it.153 
 
Fortunately for Mill, Harriet provided him what he sometimes called his second 
great “prize in the lottery of life” in her daughter Helen, who was able to aid him in his 
grieving and to keep his daily affairs in order.154 Following her mother’s death, Helen 
assumed the role of Mill’s caretaker and close companion, and she even became his 
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literary executor at his death. It is from her, in fact, that scholars possess some important 
evidence concerning the timeline of Mill’s work in the 1850s.  
In her introductory note to Three Essays on Religion, Helen provided some 
important context for the work:  
The two first of these three Essays were written between the years 1850 and 
1858, during the period which intervened between the publication of the 
Principles of Political Economy, and that of the work on Liberty; during which 
interval three other Essays—on Justice, on Utility, and on Liberty—were also 
composed. Of the five Essays written at that time, three have already been given 
to the public by the Author. That on Liberty was expanded into the now well-
known work bearing the same title. Those on Justice and Utility were afterwards 
incorporated, with some alterations and additions, into one, and published under 
the name of Utilitarianism.155   
 
For the purposes of this study, what is especially important is Helen’s emphasis that the 
essay on justice, which is the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism, is a separate document from 
the essays on utility. This is important as it was indicated in the previous chapter that the 
revisionist position defended here treats the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism differently 
than the other four chapters in the sense that it might be thought to better approximate 
Mill’s personal views. In that light, then, it is worth noting that Helen’s comments in the 
quote above correlate with some other evidence concerning Mill’s composition of an 
essay on justice evident in his correspondence with Harriet. In June 1854, while 
traveling, he wrote, “I do not find the essay on Justice goes on well. I wrote a good long 
piece of it at Quimper, but it is too metaphysical, & not what is most wanted but I must 
finish it now in that vein & then strike into another.”156 Similar language is repeated in 
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Mill’s brief discussion of Utilitarianism in his Autobiography where he writes that 
shortly after Harriet’s death: 
. . . I took from their repository a portion of the unpublished papers which I had 
written during the last years of our married life, and shaped them, with some 
additional matter, into the little work entitled “Utilitarianism”; which was first 
published, in three parts, in successive numbers of Fraser’s Magazine and 
afterward reprinted in a volume.157   
 
Given the context already introduced, it seems likely that the “additional matter” 
is the essay on justice. Further evidence for this hypothesis comes from a careful reading 
of chapter five by the Mill scholar Robert Schweick.158 Schweick argues that not only 
are there reasons to see the essay on justice as being separately composed from the other 
chapters, for reasons similar to those cited above, but there are substantive differences in 
this last chapter that differentiate it from earlier chapters. In particular, one finds the 
influences of Alexander Bain and Charles Darwin in that last chapter. Bain’s influence is 
evident in the fifth chapter when Mill seems to adopt the view that morality and duty are 
concerned with actions that are susceptible to sanctioning. Bain had defended precisely 
this view in his book The Emotions and The Will, which Mill had reviewed favorably.159 
Besides his view on moral sanctioning, Bain also advocated a conception of the human 
psyche whereby there was no sharp dividing line between humans and animals, but 
rather a mere continuum. This idea from Bain, Schweick goes on to add, was surely 
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buttressed in Mill’s thinking by his reading of Darwin’s book at an especially crucial 
time: 
I mentioned in my last letter that I had completed the first draft of 
[Utilitarianism]. I have read since my return here, several things which have 
interested me, above all Darwin’s book [Origin of Species]. It far surpasses my 
expectation. Though he cannot be said to have proved the truth of his doctrine, he 
does seem to have proved that it may be true which I take to be as great a triumph 
as knowledge & ingenuity could possibly achieve on such a question. Certainly 
nothing can be at first sight more entirely unplausible than his theory & yet after 
beginning by thinking it impossible, one arrives at something like an actual belief 
in it, & one certainly does not relapse into complete disbelief.160 
 
As with much of the other evidence presented here concerning Mill’s influences in his 
composition of Utilitarianism, Schweick’s evidence is not conclusive, but is suggestive 
especially when viewed in light of his close connection to Bain and the separate 
composition of the essay on justice. According to John Robson, editor of Mill’s 
Collected Works, Bain knew Mill’s work habits better than anyone other than Harriet 
and Helen (through his frequent visits to Mill while he worked at India House), and Bain 
concludes that Utilitarianism was “thoroughly revised” around this time in 1860, and 
was finished in 1861 just in time for publication in Fraser’s.161 
 There are difficult questions surrounding Mill’s reasons for publishing in 
Fraser’s Magazine. It is somewhat puzzling that Crisp insists that Mill did not have an 
especially popular audience in mind for Utilitarianism, given that Fraser’s was among 
the more popular publishing venues available for intellectual topics for the general 
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reader.162 Even if Crisp were to point to the notion that Mill always intended for the 
essays to be turned into a book (which is debatable), this does not necessarily help his 
view given Mill’s comments in 1859 to Bain on his hopes for the work:  
I do not think of publishing my Utilitarianism till next winter at the earliest, 
though it is now finished, subject to any correction or enlargement which may 
suggest itself in the interval. It will be but a small book, about a fifth less than the 
Liberty, if I make no addition to it. But small books are so much more read than 
large ones that it is an advantage when one’s matter will go into a small space 
[emphasis mine].163        
 
Mill’s explicit tie between Utilitarianism’s brevity and the readership for short works 
surely does not help Crisp’s case. Crisp might appeal to other works that Mill published 
in Fraser’s to support his contention that Mill was pursuing the most serious of 
philosophical projects when publishing there, but this will not really help his case, either. 
Granted, the topics Mill discussed in Fraser’s appear to be ones that he cared deeply 
about, but this is hardly the same as being matters of technical philosophy. Mill’s other 
publications in Fraser’s included Mill’s response to Thomas Carlyle’s piece arguing for 
the superiority of the white races (“The Negro Question,” 1850), an evaluation of 
competing proposals for voting reform—a topic that Packe says was, after women’s 
suffrage, “the greatest practical interest in his life” (“Recent Writers on Reform,”1859), 
the difficulties of a non-interventionist foreign policy—obviously relevant to a man 
working in India House (“A Few Works on Non-Intervention”, 1859), and finally a piece 
on the American Civil War—a topic that Mill spent more time on in his Autobiography 
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than he  did Utilitarianism (“The Contest in America,” 1861).164 All of these writings, to 
be sure, Mill approached with intellectual clarity and care, but not, it seems, necessarily 
with his eye firmly in the philosophical heavens.     
 Even if Crisp is correct in his claim that Utilitarianism is intended to be a careful 
philosophical treatise aimed at a limited audience, it is not altogether obvious that the 
utilitarian evangelist Mill glowed with pride for his so-called “Bible.” In 1866 Mill was 
given an opportunity by his publisher, William Longman, to supply a list of works for 
Longman to submit to the Durham Cooperative Institute so that they might be distributed 
at no cost. While On Liberty was among the titles chosen, Utilitarianism was 
conspicuously absent.165 Mill did not even seek to make sure that Utilitarianism was 
issued in an especially cheap volume, as he did for his much more technical Logic.166 In 
the eyes of Mill’s biographer Richard Reeves, who cites a number of the above reasons 
for looking at the apparent importance of Utilitarianism with suspicion, “it is clear that 
the essay was not taken as seriously by Mill as it has been by everyone else.”167    
  
“Utilitarianism” and Mill’s Biographers  
 As this last quote suggests, some of Mill’s biographers might find many of this 
study’s conclusion’s unsurprising. Many of Mill’s biographers seem not to accord 
Utilitarianism the kind of prominence in Mill’s thought that others, especially 
philosophers, have done. In the introduction to his intellectual biography of Mill, 
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Nicholas Capaldi complains that part of the problem with Mill scholarship generally is 
that scholars in different disciplines tend to read only a few of Mill’s works in relative 
isolation or out of context. “Political theorists focus on On Liberty and sometimes 
Utilitarianism, but they do not connect these with either the epistemological or the 
metaphysical doctrines. Both philosophers and political theorists almost always (C.L. 
Ten is the exception) read On Liberty in the light of Utilitarianism, even though the 
former was written before the latter.” Whatever the reasons for this misunderstanding, it 
is worth taking an overview of some of the major biographical treatments of Mill in 
order to get a general idea of how it might be seen from the perspective of those 
researchers with a broader view of Mill’s life. This section is by no means intended to be 
a historiographical essay on Mill’s biographers more generally, but only an overview of 
their respective views on Utilitarianism and its importance in Mill’s life.   
 One early biography of Mill comes from his friend Alexander Bain, who was 
especially familiar with Mill’s family, as he also wrote a biography of Mill’s father.168 
As should be evident from this study, Bain had the advantage of discussing Mill’s views 
at length, and his account of Mill’s life contains many details based on first hand 
observances that would be unknown otherwise. That said, Bain’s proximity to Mill 
sometimes contains a kind of partiality of judgment (both pro- and anti-Mill) that makes 
him a less than ideal biographer. His comments regarding Utilitarianism and its 
reception are fairly brief—occupying only four pages in a two-hundred page volume (On 
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Liberty receives nine by comparison). Already recognizing its potential influence, 
though, he writes:  
This short work has many volumes to answer for. The amount of attention it has 
received is due, in my opinion, partly to its merits, and partly to its defects. As a 
powerful advocacy of Utility, it threw the Intuitionists on the defensive; while by 
a number of unguarded utterances, it gave them important strategic positions 
which they could not fail to occupy.169    
 
Bain goes on to discuss many of the objections commonly raised against the book’s 
contents, but, notably he recognizes the final chapter on justice as being especially 
worthwhile. “The real stress of the book lies in the last chapter, which is well reasoned 
in every way, and free from damaging admissions.”170 
 Michael St. John Packe’s The Life of John Stuart Mill, published in 1954, 
remains probably the best scholarly treatment of Mill. The success of his biography is 
due to his balanced discussion of Mill’s personal life and thought. The weakness of his 
study comes from his generally dismissive treatment of Harriet, whose ideas and 
intellect he finds difficult to take seriously. It should be added, though, that Mill scholars 
today have the immense benefit of using the meticulously edited and curated Collected 
Works, thanks to the labors of John Robson, but Packe undertook his project without 
such resources and produced an impressive volume nonetheless. With respect to his 
treatment of Utilitarianism, Packe, too, is strikingly brief in his comments. He accords 
approximately two pages in a five-hundred page volume to the discussion of its contents 
(On Liberty gets approximately eight, whereas the Logic receives about twice that). In 
this brief account of the book, though, he takes the interesting tack of reading the book 
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as “reaffirming the authority of Bentham’s formula” especially with respect to Mill’s 
account of pleasure in the second chapter of Utilitarianism. In fact, the whole of Packe’s 
discussion of the contents of Utilitarianism concerns Mill’s account of pleasure, and 
from there he quickly moves on to Mill’s later projects.  
 At the beginning of the twenty-first century Nicholas Capaldi published John 
Stuart Mill: A Biography, wherein he attempted to make use of the advantage of working 
from the Collected Works. The chief contribution of Capaldi’s book is his more balanced 
portrait of Harriet and his exploration of Mill’s connection to Romanticism and the deep 
impact it had on his thinking. As is rightly noted by William Stafford in his scathing but 
insightful review of the book, Capaldi brings his own interpretation of Mill’s moral and 
political views perhaps too strongly to the fore (he gives special place to Mill’s concept 
of autonomy), which leads him to ignore, distort, or minimize aspects of Mill’s life and 
thought that do not sit nicely with his interpretation.171 Of all of Mill’s major 
biographers, Capaldi treats Utilitarianism with the greatest level of seriousness when he 
writes that, “Although Mill discussed his ethical and moral views in many places and 
throughout his life, the formal presentation of his views is to be found in 
Utilitarianism.”172 He discusses the contents of the book with some care, but does note 
that Mill did not accord it the same kind of pride of place that he did On Liberty, which 
Capaldi discusses at greater length. Also, noteworthy are Capaldi’s comments about 
Utilitarianism in a television interview in 2004. The interviewer, Brian Lamb, asked 
                                                 
171 William Stafford, review of John Stuart Mill: A Biography, by Nicholas Capaldi, Utilitas 18 
(2006): 445-447.   
172 Capaldi, John Stuart Mill, 257. 
 85 
Capaldi to list some of Mill’s works that viewers might recognize. He begins by 
mentioning and elaborating for a bit on On Liberty, Principles of Political Economy, the 
Autobiography, and the Logic. He then mentions Utilitarianism, and adds that:  
“Utilitarianism,” unfortunately, has become a kind of textbook, which, in my 
judgment, is so misunderstood because it`s turned into a sort of cardboard 
caricature of Mill`s views and is read independent of his other stuff. But I think it 
gives, to a very large extent, a distorted conception of what he believed.173 
 
Of course, in the revisionist interpretation of the book, this “distorted conception” might 
be avoided since it is not necessarily what Mill himself believed.  
Finally, in 2007 Richard Reeves, a British journalist, published John Stuart Mill: 
Victorian Firebrand, a book which emphasizes Mill’s importance as a public intellectual 
and political activist in Victorian culture. Reeves is probably the most fluid writer 
among Mill’s biographers, and he seems to have read quite widely in the Collected 
Works—especially in Mill’s correspondence. Reeves’ biography is probably the one to 
recommend to readers that are completely unfamiliar with Mill’s life and work, as he 
writes with a general audience in mind while also displaying sound historical judgment 
concerning Mill’s life and place in Victorian society. The only notable weakness in  
Reeves’ work is the overreliance on a few secondary works on Mill’s philosophical 
views, and the book does not display the same kind of subtlety in philosophical 
interpretation apparent in Packe or Capaldi. Reeves, though, takes a dim view of the 
importance of Utilitarianism. He cites some of the same evidence presented above for 
thinking that Mill held the work in low esteem (e.g., lack of commentary in the 
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Autobiography, lack of initiative in seeing the book widely distributed, etc.) in seeing the 
book , and notes that its continuing popularity might be due to its pedagogical virtues: 
“To this day, the ‘little treatise’ provides a training ground for would-be philosophers, 
most of whom are given the agreeable task of pointing out the deficiencies in its 
argument. . . . ”174 Nonetheless, Reeves, too, concludes that the work stands as Mill’s 
attempt to “put all of his own cards on the table, ” thus according, to some extent, with 
the orthodox reading.175 What is striking is that the revisionist interpretation actually 
seems to fit Reeve’s evidence and general attitude toward Utilitarianism better than it 
fits the orthodox reading. Reeves, though, does not appear to be familiar with Jacobson’s 
work or the revisionist interpretation, and it is an interesting question whether he, and 
possibly other biographers before him, might accept it if they had.  
While the answer to this last question is unclear, this brief survey should be 
sufficient to make it plain that those writers who have surveyed Mill’s writing across his 
life have a less than laudatory attitude toward Utilitarianism, and would presumably 
adopt a skeptical stance toward the special pride of place accorded to the work in the 
orthodox reading. While their generally negative attitude toward Utilitarianism does not 
necessarily directly support the revisionist reading, it does raise questions about the 
soundness of the orthodox reading given that that position involves Utilitarianism 
standing as the pinnacle of Mill’s thoughts on the view. As Capaldi put it in his 
interview, Mill’s views in Utilitarianism appear to be a “cardboard caricature” of his 
developed moral theory, a fact that looks quite odd if the book is taken to be the 
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definitive statement from one of the most famous figures in the history of utilitarian 
theory.  
 
The Reception of “Utilitarianism”  
 In an introduction to a popular edition of Mill’s works, the noted Mill scholar 
Alan Ryan wrote that Utilitarianism “has become a classic more through the efforts of 
his enemies than those of its friends.”176 As Jacobson noted, the book’s brevity along 
with Mill’s clear prose, memorable phrasing, and vivid examples make the work a 
favorite choice in philosophy seminars as well as introductory courses in ethics—even if 
few within those classes end up defending the cogency of Mill’s arguments. In many 
philosophy classrooms, Mill’s arguments, especially in chapters two and four, are 
discussed only to be dismantled by philosophical neophyte and scholar alike. In this last 
section of the chapter, it seems appropriate for the sake of defending the revisionist 
position to review some of the published responses to the work to further fill in the story 
of how Utilitarianism came to hold the place that it does in the history of moral 
philosophy.   
While the pedagogical use of Mill’s text is surely a factor in its endurance, there 
remains the question of how exactly the arguments came to be as familiar as they are 
today. J.B. Schneewind has provided part of the answer to this question in his overview 
of the immediate responses to Utilitarianism.177 While it is not necessary to highlight all 
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of the common themes in those reviews, it is worth discussing three themes that emerge 
in many of the published responses: problems in Mill’s “proof” for the principle of 
utility in chapter four, problems in Mill’s discussion of higher and lower pleasures, and, 
the use of intermediate rules to serve as guides for moral action. As was noted in the 
discussion of the book in Chapter II of this work, these three themes are still common 
points of discussion in interpreting Mill’s philosophy. By emphasizing the continuity 
between the criticisms of Mill’s contemporaries with those of today, the idea that the 
book’s success is due less to Mill’s own aims and wishes and more to the philosopher’s 
love of criticism becomes more plausible.    
Difficulties were noticed in Mill’s discussion of his “proof” for the principle of 
utility in 1864 when an anonymous reviewer called attention to Mill’s apparently 
mistaken analogy between the visible and the desirable.178 Citing different problems 
with the proof, another reviewer for the North American Review suggests that Mill has 
failed to show that by desiring her own happiness an individual cannot be claimed, 
thereby, to desire the general happiness as concluding such would serve as an example 
of fallacy of composition.179 Mill’s discussion of higher and lower pleasures in chapter 
two was hardly better received. Some critics think that Mill is plainly inconsistent in the 
passage while others take the view that Mill is consistent, but that his view represents a 
move away from pure utilitarianism. John Grote, generally one of the more prescient 
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critics of Mill in the nineteenth century, thought that Mill’s insistence on a quality and 
quantity distinction of pleasures was fundamentally incompatible with utilitarianism.180  
Aside from these first two reactions, there is an interesting set of responses to 
Mill’s idea that the utilitarian might employ secondary rules for the sake of utilitarian 
principles so that one need not necessarily calculate at the moment of decision making 
(recall the discussion from chapter two of Utilitarianism concerning the use of 
landmarks). According to Schneewind, many of Mill’s critics seemed to grasp that Mill 
is attempting to show that utilitarianism is not committed to the absurd conclusions that 
they ascribe to Bentham or Godwin’s utilitarianism.181 Some like James McCosh and 
W.E.H. Lecky (both of whom wrote books on the history of ethics) brought up a number 
of the same old charges against Mill’s reliance on these rules, while others like Robert 
Watts thought that Mill might avoid some of these but feared that utilitarianism would 
devolve into “Jesuitry.” Henry Reeve, editor of the Whig Edinburgh Review, blames 
utilitarianism for everything from the increase in political corruption to the loss of 
parental authority to decline in female decorum. 
What these responses indicate is that from early on Utilitarianism provoked 
responses common to readers today, which partly explains its popularity and the saliency 
of certain portions of the book. Schneewind, though, makes a prescient remark in his 
discussion of the book’s reception when he notes Mill’s success with the book in 
rehabilitating utilitarianism’s image among many of Mill’s contemporary philosophers. 
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In Utilitarianism Mill attempted to explain how utilitarianism can cohere with many 
common-sense moral beliefs. The intuitionists who opposed Bentham, Godwin, and 
Austin tended to see the utilitarians as giving short shrift to common morality and thus 
saw them as an entirely pernicious influence. Mill’s distinction of the higher and lower 
pleasures, for instance, caused some to doubt the logical consistency of his views, but 
not the noble motives that were the source of the arguments. As William Kirkus wrote, 
“Whether or not happiness be the sole criterion of morality, Mr. Mill’s conclusions are 
all on the right side.”182  
The final picture which emerges from this examination of the book’s early 
reception is perhaps an ironic one. Mill achieved his goal of publishing a general defense 
of the principle of utility that raised its respectability among his fellow intellectuals, but 
did so at a high cost. This is so because Mill wrote a document that has been misread 
continuously by generations of scholars who have believed that by carefully studying his 
arguments there that they could discern his developed views on moral philosophy. As 
should be evident from this chapter, this belief on the part of scholars is a false one once 
one considers the full context of Mill’s life and relationship to utilitarianism. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter will serve as the conclusion to this thesis and will proceed in four 
sections including these opening remarks. Section two will provide a restatement of the 
evidence supporting the orthodox and revisionist positions. The third section will discuss 
the especially important elements of the previous chapter that suggest that the historical 
evidence supports the revisionist position. The fourth section will address the 
implications of the historical evidence standing in greater support of the revisionist 
position, and provide a note on why the outcome of this debate is important for historical 
scholarship dealing with Mill’s life and works.     
 
Orthodoxy versus Revisionism  
 It is important to be clear that Crisp’s orthodox position, as its name implies, is 
the most widely held in Mill scholarship. One of the more common ideas in the literature 
is the idea that one must find a way of squaring Mill’s claims in On Liberty with his 
claims in Utilitarianism, especially since the works were composed at similar points in 
Mill’s life, and Mill affirmed the importance of utility in both. In the orthodox view, 
Mill defended his version of utilitarianism in Utilitarianism just as much as he affirmed 
his version of liberalism in On Liberty. In the revisionist view, on the other hand, Mill 
defended his liberalism in On Liberty, but not necessarily his view of utilitarianism in 
Utilitarianism. The exception to this might be in the case of chapter five of that work, 
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which might deserve special treatment for reasons that have already been discussed. 
What the revisionist view entails, then, is a very different approach to reading 
Utilitarianism. With this idea of what is at stake, then, it is worth revisiting what the 
historical arguments are in support of each position.       
 Taking Crisp as the representative for the orthodox position, one can divide 
Crisp’s arguments into three parts. The first part is biographical, and focuses on 
picturing Mill’s development as a young utilitarian who eventually broke with 
Bentham’s views in a deep way. Crisp notes the fact that Mill moved on to other projects 
(political, personal, and philosophical) following his apparently definitive statement of 
his views in 1861. Second, Crisp highlights the continuity of themes in Mill’s earlier 
works on moral philosophy that also appear in the text of Utilitarianism. This includes 
Mill’s focus on criticizing intuitionist moral philosophers, his focus on the relationship 
between primary and secondary principles, as well as his discussion on character, 
happiness, and moral motivation. Crisp admits that the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism 
does not fit easily into the narrative of Mill building on his previous work in moral 
theory, but that the other four chapters surely do. The third component concerns his view 
of Mill’s use of rhetoric in Utilitarianism. Crisp seems to have the view that 
Utilitarianism, in contrast to other works like On Liberty, was written not for widespread 
public consumption, but rather as a philosophical treatise to persuade educated readers. 
At the same time, though it should be read as a careful philosophical analysis, Mill was, 
at times, writing to persuade rather than give his true thoughts. In cases where it looks as 
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if Mill is making a claim that seems inconsistent with his utilitarianism, he is probably 
intending to persuade the reader in those passages.  
 Taking Jacobson as the representative for the revisionist position, one can break 
down his arguments into four parts. The first part attempts to establish the fact that Mill 
had an especially idiosyncratic view of utilitarianism, which is evident from his letter to 
Carlyle in his letter in 1834, and his comments in other writings before the appearance of 
Utilitarianism. In a number of ways, Mill seems to be stepping back into Benthamism in 
the text of Utilitarianism more than he is departing from it. For instance, despite his 
ardent defense of it in other places in his writings on ethics, Mill makes no defense of 
supererogation in Utilitarianism, which is just what the revisionist position would 
predict since it is supposed to be, for the most part, a non-partisan defense of 
utilitarianism. The second part of his argument concerns Mill’s capacious understanding 
of the term ‘utilitarianism’ within the 1861 text by that name. In a number of passages, 
Mill seems to align himself with a number of understandings of the term in his 
discussion of the view’s historical forbearers, and might even be thought to be working 
with several notions of it within different chapters (e.g., in chapter two and chapter four). 
This would make sense, Jacobson claims, if his chief philosophical opponents in the text 
are the intuitionist moral philosophers, which seems apparent in the text even in chapters 
one and two.  
 The third part of Jacobson’s version of the revisionist position concerns Mill’s 
use of the greatest happiness principle. Jacobson points out that in Mill’s wording of the 
greatest happiness principle, Mill might be thought to be announcing his ecumenical 
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intentions for the document when he says in a footnote that the term utilitarianism 
should be understood, “as a name for one single opinion, not a set of opinions—to 
denote the recognition of utility as a standard, not any particular way of applying it.”183 
Jacobson acknowledges that Crisp might respond that Mill is only speaking of possibly 
different ways of interpreting primary and secondary principles for the principle of 
utility, and that the wording of the greatest happiness principle seems to speak in favor 
of only one kind of utilitarianism (i.e., direct and act-utilitarianism). However, Jacobson 
points out that Mill is aware of other kinds of indirect utilitarians such that they also 
might be thought of as being included among those who would identify with the greatest 
happiness principle. Finally, Jacobson highlights the extra-textual factors that speak in 
favor of the revisionist position. This includes evidence from Mill’s correspondence 
concerning his evaluation of the book and its importance (e.g., calling it his “little work” 
and mentioning it only briefly in his Autobiography), and it also includes the fact that 
Mill published his work in Fraser’s—a publication to which Mill did not usually turn 
when wanting to publish his most philosophically-oriented work. Jacobson also points 
out that Mill did not revise Utilitarianism even when Theodore Gomperz pointed out a 
possible fallacy in his arguments. Mill had plenty of time to go back and revise 
Utilitarianism before he died (he regularly revised other works like the Principles and 
the Logic for new editions), but apparently chose not to except for a few very minor 
changes and an update to certain portions of his comments in chapter five .   
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Concise Overview of the Evidence for Revisionism  
 Viewed from a certain perspective, one might characterize the thrust of this study 
as simultaneously supplementing and corroborating Jacobson’s arguments while also 
challenging the general narrative of Mill’s intellectual development as it is advanced in 
Crisp’s arguments. That is not to say Crisp’s claims are wholly false and that Jacobson’s 
arguments are wholly satisfactory. A number of Crisp’s points of emphasis concerning 
Mill’s life are accurate, and Jacobson does not seem to appreciate fully the need for the 
special treatment of chapter five. That said, the evidence presented in the previous 
chapter of this study should be viewed as supporting the revisionist thesis, and it is worth 
making clear why this is so. 
 In the section above concerning the history of utilitarianism the objective was to 
complicate the narrative Crisp put forward concerning Mill’s development as a 
utilitarian. This was done in two ways. First, it was argued that though Mill certainly 
criticized Bentham in his essays in the 1830s, he did so rather quietly and made sure that 
it was not widely known who had published these critiques. Even at the period of his life 
where he was probably the most critical of the school of Bentham, Mill avoided 
publically aligning himself with an anti-Benthamite approach, and later expressed some 
regret over writing those essays in his Autobiography. Also, in his later writings on 
moral philosophy, Mill seems more concerned with defending than attacking Bentham, 
something that seems at odds with Crisp’s account. The second complication to Crisp’s 
narrative concerns Mill’s target in his revision of his doctrine of higher and lower 
pleasures. While scholars often claim that Mill has Bentham as the target of critique in 
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these passages, there is evidence suggesting that Bentham would actually be in concert 
with Mill in many of his points, and that it was Carlyle about whom Mill is especially 
concerned. By this reading, Mill should be seen as trying to appropriate Stoicism into 
Epicureanism (which was already associated with utilitarianism) so as to combat 
Carlyle’s new asceticism. This is an important addition to the revisionist position 
because it furthers the point that Mill is being ecumenical in giving support for the 
utilitarian cause, and is more concerned with attacking opponents of utilitarianism 
(which Carlyle surely was!) than other utilitarians such as Bentham.  
 In the section of this work concerning Mill’s life leading up to the publication of 
Utilitarianism, the point was to situate Mill as properly ready to write the book as he did. 
After suffering through his mental crisis and learning a number of lessons from the 
Romantic movement, Mill established his intellectual reputation with works like the 
Principles and the Logic. After he married Harriet, Mill’s health scare made it evident to 
him that he should be concerned with getting his thoughts down on paper before the end 
of his life. In his correspondence with Harriet during this time (1854), one finds Mill 
plotting most of his major works for the remainder of his life, and there is evidence from 
his journals that Mill began writing portions of Utilitarianism during this period. 
Furthermore, it helps the revisionist case if there is evidence that Mill saw the need for a 
general defense of the principle of utility, and in Mill’s correspondence there are three 
places where one finds precisely that. Two of these occur before the publication of 
Utilitarianism. He writes to John Austin suggesting that Austin should undertake the 
project (which Austin does not), and later he writes to Gomperz saying a defense would 
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be helpful for the cause if he published some papers he has defending “the ethics of 
utility.” The last letter concerns his note to Charles Dupont-White in which Mill asks 
that he look for the chapters appearing in Fraser’s. Mill wrote that that the idea of utility 
and the school of Bentham had not been popular in England, contrary to French opinion, 
and he expressed hope that this document might improve popular opinion of the view.  
 In addressing the great question of Mill’s intentions in writing Utilitarianism, 
there are sub-questions concerning whether all of the chapters of Utilitarianism should 
be considered of equal worth, and why Mill published the work in Fraser’s. This study 
should serve the purpose of suggesting that chapter five of Utilitarianism deserves 
different treatment than the other four chapters. As Helen Taylor indicates, Mill later 
added the fifth chapter to the other original four chapters, which partly explains its 
difference in content from the rest of the book. Evidence from Mill’s correspondence 
with Bain also suggests that he worked on this essay separately, and that he may have 
revised the essay in light of reading Bain’s work in psychology and Darwin’s work in 
biology. In citing the work of Robert Schweick, it was suggested that Mill’s reading of 
Bain and Darwin suggests reasons for changes in style and content in chapter five of 
Utilitarianism, which goes some way toward arguing that it deserves special 
consideration for being reflective of Mill’s personal views. With respect to the question 
about Fraser’s, it seems apparent that Mill’s decision to publish Utilitarianism first in 
Fraser’s speaks to his desire for a wide and not necessarily strictly philosophical 
readership. Fraser’s was not as intellectually respectable as some of the other venues in 
which Mill published, and its readership was fairly large for the time. Also, an 
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examination of his other works published in Fraser’s reveals a pattern that accords 
precisely with what the revisionist would predict: topics about which Mill cared deeply 
(e.g., voting reform and the American Civil War) and wanted to change public 
perception. At the same time, Mill’s minimal discussion of the work in the 
Autobiography and his lack of enthusiasm for its being published on a large scale says 
something about the importance he accorded it in comparison to his other works. By the 
orthodox position, it seems quite strange that Mill would decline to allow for free copies 
of Utilitarianism to be given out when he had the opportunity, and that he would pass up 
the chance to see it appear in a cheap edition as he did for his much more technical work 
in logic.   
 The purpose of the historiographical section of the last chapter of this essay is to 
illustrate the lack of attention accorded to Utilitarianism by those writers who have a 
larger perspective on Mill’s life. From the discussion of the different biographies, it 
seems clear that the emphasis typically placed on the work by Mill’s biographers is at 
odds with the kind of emphasis that the orthodox interpretation has for the document. 
Bain and Packe hardly discuss the book at all, and accord it little attention in comparison 
to Mill’s other works. In the text of his book Capaldi says that Mill’s definitive 
statements on ethics can be found there, but in the interview about the book he seems to 
take a much dimmer view of the work as a representation of Mill’s mature thoughts. 
Though Reeves says that the book is an example of him giving his final views on moral 
philosophy, it was suggested that this opinion is actually in tension with much of the 
tenor of Reeves’ discussion and that he would perhaps agree with the revisionist thesis if 
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he were aware of it. Taken together, the low esteem among Mill’s biographers for 
Utilitarianism provides another example of how philosophers and some intellectual 
historians have a misplaced emphasis on the book’s importance for understanding Mill, 
and how a larger view of Mill’s life is perhaps what is needed to accord the book its 
proper place.  
 Finally, in the last section of the previous chapter there was a discussion of the 
initial reception of Utilitarianism among Mill’s contemporaries. The purpose for 
including this section was to begin to offer an answer to the question of how, if the 
revisionist thesis is correct, Utilitarianism took on the importance that it has. As has 
been emphasized at several points of the discussion here, it may well be that 
Utilitarianism has achieved the popularity it has more because of  its pedagogical value 
than for its insight into Mill’s ultimate views on moral philosophy. This section shows 
that even the book’s earliest readers began to pick on arguments and difficulties that 
have become common points of discussion in seminar rooms for the last several decades. 
While this does not necessarily count against the orthodox position, it does add to the 
plausibility of the revisionist thesis since it explains how the book might have achieved 
fame in spite of being misinterpreted in terms of how the work relates to Mill’s ultimate 
views on moral theory.  
 
Implications 
 If the arguments presented here are correct, there remains a significant amount 
that needs to be explained in terms of how Mill scholarship should move forward. As 
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was noted toward the outset of this chapter, one of the chief difficulties in Mill 
scholarship concerning his moral and political philosophy has been to try to square the 
claims of Utilitarianism with those of On Liberty. If this thesis is correct, and the 
revisionist position is more plausible than the former orthodox position, then this central 
difficulty becomes even more trying since so much of Mill scholarship has been working 
with the assumption that Mill’s comments in Utilitarianism should be read as Mill 
defending his own position.  
Despite these difficulties, insofar as historians of Mill’s thought are interested in 
finding out what Mill truly believed, it is essential that they use all of the available 
evidence to determine his intentions and evaluation of his works. From what has been 
said so far, there appears to be good reason to accord chapter five of Utilitarianism a 
special kind of consideration. Chapter five contains a number of original and interesting 
thoughts on Mill’s behalf (as was discussed in the summary of that chapter), and one of 
the implications of this thesis might be that this chapter will receive some of the scrutiny 
that has heretofore been devoted to analyzing  the passages in chapter two and chapter 
four. Regardless, the book will surely continue to be puzzled over by historians and 
philosophers for some time, and one hopes that this study has shifted in at least a small 
way, which kind of puzzles have hopes of being completed and which kind should now 
be set aside. 
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